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INTRODUCTION 
Caseload volume has been a thorn in the side of the federal appellate system for 
over a half-century.1  A rise in the number of appeals has not been accompanied by a 
commensurate increase in judges to handle those appeals2 nor has the system been 
restructured to handle the additional caseload.3  Still, the caseload has been managed 
                                                           
 1 RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS:  CRISIS AND REFORM 59 (1985); David R. 
Cleveland, Overturning the Last Stone:  The Final Step in Returning Precedential Status to All 
Opinions, 10 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 61, 63 (2009); Will Shafroth, Survey of the United 
States Courts of Appeals, reprinted in 42 F.R.D. 243 (1967); Martha J. Dragich, Once a 
Century:  Time for a Structural Overhaul of the Federal Courts, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 11, 12 
(1996); Donald P. Lay, Query:  Will the Proposed National Court of Appeals Create More 
Problems Than It Solves?, 66 JUDICATURE 437, 437 (1982–1983); Maurice Rosenberg, 
Enlarging the Federal Courts’ Capacity to Settle the National Law, 10 GONZ. L. REV. 709, 
711 (1975); PAUL D. CARRINGTON, DANIEL JOHN MEADOR & MAURICE ROSENBERG, JUSTICE 
ON APPEAL v (1976); Wade H. McCree, Bureaucratic Justice:  An Early Warning, 129 U. PA. 
L. REV. 777, 781–82 (1981); J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Drawbacks of Growth in the 
Federal Judiciary, 43 EMORY L.J. 1147, 1157 (1994).  
 2 Cleveland, supra note 1, at 68, 173 (noting that the number of judges has only modestly 
increased compared to the “ever-increasing number of cases”); COMM’N ON STRUCTURAL 
ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FED. COURTS OF APPEALS, FINAL REPORT 14 (1998) [hereinafter FINAL 
REPORT]; REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 110 (Apr. 2, 1990) [hereinafter 
1990 REPORT], available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/repfcsc.pdf/$file/repfcsc 
.pdf; Robert M. Parker & Leslie J. Hagin, Federal Courts at the Crossroads:  Adapt or Lose!, 
14 MISS. C. L. REV. 211, 211 n.1 (1994); Arthur D. Hellman, The Crisis in the Circuits and 
the Innovations of the Browning Years, in RESTRUCTURING JUSTICE 3, 5 (Arthur D. Hellman 
ed., 1990) (“The number of federal appellate judges has [] expanded, but at a pace that lags far 
behind the growth in filings.”). 
 3 Since the creation of the federal court system in 1789, there has only been one overhaul 
of its structure. Dragich, supra note 1, at 12.  Reform of the federal court system was 
accomplished through the “Evarts Act.”  Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 
[hereinafter Evarts Act].  The Evarts Act “instituted a radically different structure for the 
federal courts.  It expanded the federal court system from two to three tiers.”  Dragich, supra 
note 2, at 20; J. Clifford Wallace, The Nature and Extent of Intercircuit Conflicts:  A Solution 
Needed for a Mountain or a Molehill?, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 913, 913 (1983); see also Paul D. 
Carrington, The Function of the Civil Appeal:  A Late-Century View, 38 S.C. L. REV. 411, 412 
(1987).  Despite the concern that adding an intermediate level of courts between the district 
courts and the Supreme Court of the United States “might impair the dignity of office and the 
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by internal procedural reforms such as reduction of oral argument, increased reliance 
on court staff, and limitations on publication of opinions.4  These changes have 
presented a partial solution and largely managed the “crisis” of volume, albeit by 
altering the nature of appellate justice.5  These alterations of the traditional model of 
appellate justice have been the target of considerable criticism.6  In sum, “we have 
lowered our expectations for appellate procedure.  We have defined down our 
appellate values.  We have all internalized the post-modern norms of minimalist 
procedural paradigm.”7  
While the language of crisis has diminished, the caseload volume problem 
continues to bedevil the federal appellate courts,8 and the altered process adopted 
                                                           
zeal of sitting judges,” the Evarts proposal was passed with little opposition. Carrington, supra 
note 3, at 415–16. 
 4 Dragich, supra note 1, at 17, 24.  Such reforms “amount to procedural shortcuts, 
resulting in an abbreviated appellate process, justified for the most part by the press of docket. 
. . . [i]ntramural reforms have been grouped [] by appellate function:  oral argument, briefing, 
opinion writing, case management techniques, and staffing arrangements.”  Thomas E. Baker, 
Intramural Reforms: How the U.S. Courts of Appeals Have Helped Themselves, 22 FLA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 913, 913 (1995); see also THOMAS E. BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL 32 
(1994) [hereinafter BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL] (discussing the three goals of 
appellate reform: “(1) increasing the efficiency of the present capacity; (2) increasing the 
capacity at a constant efficiency; or (3) reducing the allowable demand on the system”); Lay, 
supra note 1, at 437 (noting that these innovating processes have helped the courts of appeals 
to deal with the case crunch, but judges are still working “to the very limit of their human 
capacities”); Richard A. Posner, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Survive Until 1984?, 56 
S. CAL. L. REV. 761, 765 (1983); McCree, supra note 1, at 777.  But see Wallace, supra note 
3, at 914 (noting that some of these proposed “cures” for the caseload problem may prove to 
be worse than the so-called caseload “disease” in the long run).  
 5 Lauren K. Robel, Caseload and Judging: Judicial Adaptations to Caseload, 1990 BYU 
L. REV. 3, 4; CARRINGTON, MEADOR & ROSENBERG, supra note 1, at v (different types of 
reforms implemented over the past half century to deal with the ever-increasing case load 
“undermine basic values, destroying the qualities of deliberateness and personal concern that 
are essential to appellate justice”); McCree, supra note 2, at 778 (reforms implemented to 
increase efficiency in the federal judiciary have lead to “significant costs to quality of 
justice”); Dragich, supra note 1, at 13 (“Measures adopted to cope with rising caseloads have 
exacerbated the “crisis” by sharply altering time-honored traditions of appellate justice.”). 
 6 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.  But see Posner, supra note 4, at 764.  Posner 
suggests that we may have to lower our expectations and accept the decline in the quality of 
justice: 
The average quality of many products and services has decreased over time as a 
function of mass production and consumption.  If federal justice has at last been 
placed into mass production—if more and more people enjoy access to the federal 
courts—should we not accept the decline in the average quality of those courts as the 
inevitable concomitant of moving from an elite to a mass provision of judicial 
services?   
Id.  
 7 Thomas E. Baker, Applied Freakonomics:  Explaining the “Crisis of Volume,” 8 J. APP. 
PRAC. & PROCESS 101, 114 (2006).  
 8 Cleveland, supra note 1, at 68; Martin K. Levy, The Mechanics of Federal Appeals:  
Uniformity and Case Management in the Circuit Courts, 61 DUKE L.J. 315, 324–25 (2011). 
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bears some reconsideration.  Admittedly, while the volume problem is easy to 
describe, there are just too many cases to handle with current resources using the 
time-honored appellate process; there is no simple solution.9  The path of least 
resistance—sacrificing appellate standards—has proven workable and effective, and 
the more significant steps such as reducing appeals or increasing judicial resources 
have gone unadopted.10  Various studies and proposals of the federal court system 
have suggested other methods that could be used to address the problem, and these 
methods should be seriously considered by the federal judiciary and Congress to 
improve access, fairness, and accountability.11  If need be, a new federal court study 
should be undertaken to help select some of these methods or generate new twenty-
first century methods of addressing the issue.  Perhaps a sober second look, freed 
from the debate over the existence of a crisis, will result in reform that restores some 
of the traditional appellate process while still managing present, and anticipated 
future, caseload volume. 
I.  HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL COURTS’ VOLUME PROBLEM 
Concerns about the size of appellate caseloads and the quality of justice are not 
new.12  To some extent, they predate the United States entirely.  However, the acute 
and measurable caseload crunch is a twentieth century phenomenon.13  The United 
States federal appellate court structure, created in the late eighteenth century, has 
struggled to deal with the expanded population, litigation, and federal court purview 
                                                           
 9 Levy, supra note 8, at 321. 
For much of the past century, federal appellate judges did not need case management 
as it is conceived of today—that is, judges did not need to make decisions about the 
amount and kind of judicial attention to give each case based on concerns about the 
size of their docket.  They were able to hear oral argument in nearly all cases, draft 
dispositions in chambers, and publish those dispositions in the form of full-length 
opinions.  Judges and scholars alike have spoken with nostalgia about this era—one 
defined by what has been called the “traditional model” of appellate decisionmaking. 
Id. at 320.  
 10 Dragich, supra note 2, at 17, 24. 
 11 Levy, supra note 9, at 318 (noting that the last major study of federal court case 
management practices was over a decade ago); see also infra Part II.C. 
 12 Cleveland, supra note 1, at 63 (“[C]oncern over the increasing volume of federal case 
decisions was expressed as early as 1915 . . . .”); Carrington, supra note 3, at 413 (the problem 
with appellate court congestion was evident by 1848); see also 1990 REPORT, supra note 2.  
 13 Posner, supra note 4, at 761–62.  Although the federal courts of appeals felt the 
caseload pressures in the early twentieth century, they really began to experience significant 
increases in appeals between 1960 and the early 1980s: 
In the year that ended on June 30, 1981, the number of appeals filed in the federal 
courts of appeals increased by 13.6 percent over the number filed in the previous 
fiscal year.  It is now 58.3 percent higher than it was as recently as 1975, and more 
than 400 percent higher than it was in 1960.  
Id.  
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of the late twentieth century.14  In the late twentieth century, this was perceived as a 
“crisis of volume” in the appellate, especially federal appellate, courts.15  As the 
courts move into the twenty-first century, claims of a “crisis” have faded away 
because federal courts have enacted internal reforms to facilitate the processing of 
these cases, but these reforms have altered the appellate process and have not 
addressed the underlying issue of incoming cases or limited judicial resources.16  
Whether the political, public, and judicial will exists to enact systemic reforms 
remains to be seen, but concerns of diminished appellate justice and ever-increasing 
volume should at least drive all stakeholders to continued reflection on the issue. 
A.  Historical and Modern Caseload Volume Problems 
Concern about increasing appellate case decisions date back to the early days of 
published appellate opinions in early common law England.  This concern, however, 
was not that there were too many cases for the judicial system to handle but a worry 
about the number of opinions being written being more than reporters could report 
and lawyers could research.17  To some extent, this concern was justified.  The 
contemporary technology and system of reporting was ill-suited to produce accurate 
                                                           
 14 See, e.g., Carrington, supra note 3, at 412 (discussing the formation of today’s appellate 
structure through the Judiciary Act of 1798); Joseph F. Weis, Jr., The Case for Appellate 
Court Revision, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1266, 1270 (1995) (stating that today’s appellate structure 
reflects communication and travel considerations, amongst other things, that were important 
two centuries ago, but are no longer relevant with advancements in technology and means of 
travel); BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 4, at 287–88 (noting that while 
appellate courts have somewhat managed to cope with the caseload increases through internal 
reforms, they continue to struggle, and they are forced to ration justice). 
 15 See, e.g., PAUL D. CARRINGTON, AM. BAR FOUND., ACCOMMODATING THE WORKLOAD OF 
THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS (1968); POSNER, supra note 1 (citing DANIEL J. 
MEADOR, APPELLATE COURTS:  STAFF AND PROCESS IN THE CRISIS OF VOLUME (1974)); 
Michael C. Gizzi, Examining the Crisis of Volume in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 77 
JUDICATURE 96 (1993); Jack M. Beermann, Crisis? What Crisis?, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 1383 
(1986); BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 4; Arthur D. Hellman, The Crisis 
in the Circuits and the Innovations of the Browning Years, in RESTRUCTURING JUSTICE 3 
(Arthur D. Hellman ed., 1990); Lauren K. Robel, The Politics of Crisis in the Federal Courts, 
7 J. DISP. RESOL. 115 (1991); Shirley M. Hufstedler, Bad Recipes for Good Cooks—
Indigestible Reforms of the Judiciary, 27 ARIZ. L. REV. 785 (1985). 
 16 Baker, supra note 7, at 102. 
Over the last ten years or so, however, the doomsday clamor has died away and the 
sense of urgency has disappeared.  But the caseload did not subside—appellate 
demand did not decline.  Indeed, it continued to grow apace.  Furthermore, there was 
no radical structural reform.  Yet, today the courts of appeals are not hopelessly 
backlogged.  There is no panicky sense of being overwhelmed.  Everything seems to 
be “business as usual,” at least on the surface. 
Id. 
 17 Lord Coke, one of the earliest, staunchest, and most eloquent advocates of precedent 
and publication (and public access) nevertheless expressed concern about the reports of cases 
becoming elephantine in proportions.  2 COKE REP. iii-iv (1777).  
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and comprehensive reports of decisions.18  This same concern drove the move to 
designate some decisions as “unpublished” in the 1970s—a practice indicative of the 
type of procedural shortcut that gains efficiency at the cost of basic appellate 
values.19  But the concern that too many published cases would overwhelm or 
muddle the common law was unfounded.20  Increased decisions provide more fodder 
for common law analysis and better predictability and detail in the common law.21 
Moreover, technological changes to the system of case reporting in the late-twentieth 
century greatly increased the efficiency of reporting and researching cases.22 
But the concern about proliferation of written case decisions is only a small part 
of the greater concern over case volume and the ability of the courts to provide 
appellate justice in the face of an increased caseload.  
B.  Roots of the Modern Volume Problem 
The increase in appellate filings is undeniable, as is the much smaller relative 
increase in appellate judges,23 but the root causes of the increase in volume is more 
complex.  In fact, Paul D. Carrington, a well-respected and prolific author on the 
subject of appellate court structure has stated: 
We cannot explain the enormous increase in caseloads of the United 
States courts of appeal.  The possible causes are far too many and too 
interlocking to allow us to comprehend . . . we do know that the increase 
has no obvious cause, being out of all proportion to the growth of the 
                                                           
 18 Cleveland, supra note 1, at 76 (“The second issue impeding the increased reliance on 
precedent as binding authority was the poor quality of the reports throughout the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries. . . . by the mid-eighteenth century, reports of greater accuracy and 
reliability were made, which increased the ability of judges to more faithfully adhere to 
precedent.”). 
 19 See generally id. 
 20 Robert C. Berring, Legal Research and Legal Concepts:  Where Form Molds Concept, 
75 CALIF. L. REV. 15, 21, 23 (1987); Kirt Shuldberg, Comment, Digital Influence:  
Technology and Unpublished Opinions in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 
541, 551 (1997) (“[H]istoric rationales for the limited publication/no-citation plans warrant re-
examination in light of current technology.”).  
 21 Indeed, the attempt to artificially replace the multiplicity of opinions with concise 
restatements of the law was unsuccessful.  See Cleveland, supra note 1, at 84 (describing the 
American Law Institute’s attempt in the early twentieth century to obviate the need for 
citation to cases by publishing distilled rules of law in the form of Restatements, which 
produced a useful secondary source but did not diminish the call for case law reports). 
 22 Berring, supra note 20, at 21; Shuldberg, supra note 20, at 551 (“[H]istoric rationales 
for the limited publication/no-citation plans warrant re-examination in light of current 
technology.”).  
 23 Cleveland, supra note 1, at 68 (“In 1970, the Courts of Appeals disposed of 10,699 
cases, while in 2005, the Courts disposed of 67,582 cases.  During that same period the 
number of active circuit judges increased much more modestly, from ninety-seven to 167.”);  
see also JAMES C. DUFF, ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 
(2006), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/FederalCourts/AnnualReport/2006.pdf. 
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caseloads in the district courts or the Supreme Court or any other judicial 
institution in America.24 
Reasons for the explosion in appellate filings are, as Carrington suggests, many 
and varied.25  They are sometimes simple and measurable, as in the overall increase 
in U.S. population,26 and sometimes intangible, like the suggestion that Americans 
are simply more litigious and less willing to accept a trial court’s holding.27  Some of 
the proffered explanations are more fundamental, such as expansions of civil rights 
laws, the constitutionalizing of criminal procedure, and the addition of federal 
programs and prohibitions in the late 1960s and early 1970s, which coincide with the 
greatest increase in appellate filings and the greatest complaints about a crisis of 
volume.28  
                                                           
 24 Paul D. Carrington, An Unknown Court: Appellate Caseloads and the “Reckonability” 
of the Law of the Circuit, in RESTRUCTURING JUSTICE 206, 206 (Arthur D. Hellman ed., 1990).  
 25 Causes include, but are not limited to, an increase in availability of legal services to 
those criminally convicted, substantive developments in the law that have made it easier to 
assert certain claims, the durability of certain claims, and the persistence of litigants.  
CARRINGTON, MEADOR & ROSENBERG, supra note 1, at 5.  The creation of new causes of 
action has also contributed to the caseload explosion.  HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL 
JURISDICTION:  A GENERAL VIEW 22–26 (1973); see also Sarah S. Beale, Too Many and Yet 
Too Few:  New Principles to Define the Proper Limits for Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 46 
HASTINGS L.J. 979, 979–80 (1995) (There are presently over 3,000 federal crimes.  Naturally, 
an increase in federal crimes leads to more charges, convictions, and ultimately, appeals in the 
federal courts.); Carrington, supra note 3, at 413 (The growth in diversity jurisdiction of the 
lower federal courts and the creation of federal question jurisdiction of the district courts 
through the Act of 1875 exacerbated the caseload problem.).  Although Congress is aware of 
the pressures that the caseload explosion has placed on the federal courts of appeals, it has 
done nothing to limit their jurisdiction in order to alleviate some of those pressures. Dragich, 
supra note 1, at 23.   
The primary reason [for the federal courts’ present crunch of caseload explosion] is 
legislation which began in earnest in the 1960s.  Congress decided that the cure for 
many things that ail us is federal legislation—creating rights and entitlements and 
providing the [federal court] mechanism to enforce or obtain them.  It would serve no 
useful purpose . . . to evaluate in the abstract whether the new rights and entitlements 
have served the country well—clearly some have, and undoubtedly some have not. 
Parker & Hagin, supra note 2, at 228.  
 26 POSNER, supra note 1, at 59 (“The enormous increase in the population of the United 
States . . . made it inevitable that the caseload of the federal courts would expand from its 
humble beginnings.”).  
 27 CARRINGTON, MEADOR & ROSENBERG, supra note 1, at 5; see also JUDITH A. MCKENNA, 
STRUCTURAL AND OTHER ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS:  REPORT TO 
THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS AND THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 24–26 
(1993) (noting that the rate of appeal has increased forty percent since the 1950s—evidence of 
the fact that litigants are less willing to accept trial results).   
 28 Penelope Pether, Sorcerers, Not Apprentices: How Judicial Clerks and Staff Attorneys 
Impoverish U.S. Law, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 7 (2007); POSNER, supra note 1, at 83–84; 
FRIENDLY, supra note 25, at 22–26; CARRINGTON, MEADOR & ROSENBERG, supra note 1, at 5; 
Wilkinson III, supra note 1, at 1158–59.  
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The need for reform is driven not by the existence of a higher volume of cases on 
appeal, but by the harms to important values of appellate decision-making that 
higher volume causes.29  Ideally, the appellate court system has each case before it is 
decided by: 
[J]udges who are impartial; are multi-partite; are identifiable, not 
anonymous, and not mere auxiliaries; think individually, but act 
collegially; respect the interest of adversaries in being heard, but inform 
themselves fully on the material issues, evidence, and law on which 
decisions are to be made; and announce their reasons for decisions.30 
While reducing the problems associated with caseload volume is important, other 
important values of appellate justice should not be compromised in the process.  
Litigants have the right to expect their appellate case to be: (1) decided upon by a 
panel of impartial Article III judges; (2) in a timely and expeditious manner; (3) 
according to the rule of law as set forth in past precedents; (4) for reasons set forth 
by the court in its decision; (5) which the court is willing to stand by.31  These values 
can be distilled down to concerns about access, fairness, and accountability.  
Proposed reforms should promote these values whenever possible, and particular 
caution should be taken when a proposed reform impairs one of these values at the 
expense of another.  Prior reforms should be carefully reviewed through the lens of 
these values, and where they impede rather than promote these values, they should 
be reconsidered.  
C.  Major Studies and Proposals for Reform 
Growing caseloads have been the subject of several major studies undertaken by 
Congress, academics, and the court itself.32  From these studies, as well as academic 
observations, various proposals for reform have been offered over the years.  Just as 
identifying the root causes of the growth in case volume seems impossible, the 
existence of a single solution that solves the volume problem is extremely unlikely.  
In the absence of a solution, however, there is still a variety of methods dealing with 
volume that should be explored.  Moreover, methods previously undertaken to 
manage the volume must be reviewed to weigh their effectiveness and also their cost 
to the traditional appellate process and appellate values.  
Concerns about the abundance of case law, present in common law England in 
the days of Blackstone,33 recurred in the United States at the start of the twentieth 
century.  The creation of an intermediate appellate court in the federal system by the 
                                                           
 29 MCKENNA, supra note 27, at 24-26. 
 30 CARRINGTON, MEADOR & ROSENBERG, supra note 1, at 8.  
 31 Id. 
 32 See, e.g., COMM’N ON REVISION OF FED. COURT APPELLATE SYS., STRUCTURE AND 
INTERNAL PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE (1975); FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REPORT 
OF THE STUDY GROUP ON THE CASELOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT (1972) [hereinafter 1972 
REPORT]; Shafroth, supra note 1.  
 33 Due to the abundance of caselaw, Blackstone attempted to create a rational system of 
law, “organizing the common law into a sensible whole.”  Berring, supra note 20, at 16 
(1987).  However, in his attempt to create a rational and organized system of law, he was only 
successful in creating a system that appeared to be coherent and rational.  Id.  
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Circuit Courts of Appeals Act of 1891 and a move by John B. West to provide 
private, comprehensive reporting of all decisions provoked fear that lawyers and 
judges would drown in a deluge of decisions.34  That particular concern, that there 
would be too much case law for practitioners to know about, runs counter to the very 
notion of common law—that present cases are governed by the law established in 
prior cases.  Though an attempt was made to replace the comprehensive case 
reporting with a summary or restatement of the state of the law, this alternative never 
caught on, presumably, because lawyers and judges preferred to reference the 
precedent directly rather than rely on a secondary source.35  This concern was also 
essentially obviated by developments of data storage and indexing technology of the 
late twentieth century.36  
Despite this principled and widely-held preference for published decisions, these 
values were sacrificed in an early internal reform of the federal appellate courts—
limited publication.37  In the 1940s, the Third and Fifth Circuits began to experiment 
with limited publication plans, and in 1964, a Judicial Conference Report 
recommended limiting publication of some opinions.38  By 1973, the Judicial 
                                                           
 34 Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826; Thomas A. Woxland, “Forever Associated 
with the Practice of Law”: Early Years of the West Publishing Company, 5 LEGAL REFERENCE 
SERVICES Q. 115, 119 (Spring 1985).  
[T]he grand structure of law was impossible to support once the practitioner began to 
be bombarded with tens of thousands of decisions.  When publication standards 
shifted from a selection criteria of quality and utility to total comprehensiveness in 
coverage, the nature of legal literature changed dramatically.  Now the legal 
researcher was confronted with enormous amounts of available and largely undigested 
data.  
Berring, supra note 20, at 22.  
 35 See Cleveland, supra note 1, at 84 (“[L]awyers proved unwilling to rely on a secondary 
source when the words of the courts themselves were before them, and they continued to cite 
cases and to rely upon the Restatement as a useful, but secondary, source.”). 
The Restatement movement’s original goal was to provide an intelligent summary and 
analysis of the existing case law, distilling out the very best and discarding the dross. . 
. .  but such a grand plan was not fulfilled.  Though cited with great frequency early 
on, the Restatements became another secondary source.  No one stopped dipping into 
the mire of reported cases. 
Berring, supra note 20, at 23. 
 36 Id. at 25–27;  see also Scott F. Burson, Report from the Electronic Trenches: An Update 
on Computer-Assisted Legal Research, 4 LEGAL REFERENCE SERVICES Q. 3 (1984); William 
G. Harrington, A Brief History of Computer-Assisted Legal Research, 77 LAW. LIBR. J. 543 
(1985).  
 37 POSNER, supra note 1, at 122–24 (acknowledging that although universal publication 
may not be possible with the caseload volume, unpublished opinions drastically decrease the 
quality of the federal courts—unpublished opinions are generally inferior to published 
opinions, and such inferiority stems from the reduction in quality of the courts’ output).   
 38 WARREN OLNEY III, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 11 (1964), available at 
http://host4.uscourts.gov/judconf/proceedings/1964-03.pdf.  “In 1964, the Federal Judicial 
Conference recommended that the Courts of Appeals should report only those decisions that 
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Conference’s Advisory Council on Appellate Justice was ready to recommend the 
non-publication of some opinions, along with an explicit limitation on their citation 
and a sub silentio denial of precedential value of these opinions.39  These actions 
professed concern about the physical costs of publishing opinions and the intangible 
costs of researching them, but it is clear that this internal reform by the federal 
circuit courts was a method of addressing caseload volume.40  The unpublication 
proposal that it ultimately recommended fundamentally changed the nature of the 
common law and spawned a mountain of criticism,41 but at the time, the actions of 
this committee were overshadowed by the concurrently running Hruska 
Commission, which involved all three branches of government and a much broader 
mandate.42 
More concerted studies of the federal courts’ volume problems continued 
throughout the next few decades in what Thomas E. Baker has called, “[a] 
generation spent studying the United States Courts of Appeals.”43  In 1968, the 
American Bar Association (ABA) commissioned the first study of the rapidly 
expanding federal appellate caseload.44  Its report, Accommodating the Workload of 
the United States Courts of Appeals, recommended both internal reforms of how the 
courts process cases and external reforms of its structure.45  While some of the 
internal reforms have been enacted, the external reforms have not.46   
                                                           
would be of ‘general precedential value’ in order to deal with ‘the ever increasing practical 
difficulty and economic cost of establishing and maintaining accessible private and public law 
library facilities.”  Cleveland, supra note 1, at 63.  
 39 COMM. ON USE OF APPELLATE COURT ENERGIES, ADVISORY COUNCIL ON APPELLATE 
JUSTICE, STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION OF JUDICIAL OPINIONS 20 (1973).  The Advisory 
Council on Appellate Justice was created in 1971 as a non-governmental body that was to 
serve as “a liaison to the Federal Judicial Center and the National Center for State Courts.”  
BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 4, at 37.  The Council agreed, after four 
years of study, to develop guidelines to use in the restructuring of the federal appellate system.  
These guidelines were similar to those created by the Hruska Commission.  Id.  
 40 Samuel A. Alito, How Did We get Here? Where are We Going?, Keynote Address at 
Washington and Lee University Law Review Symposium:  Have We Ceased to be a Common 
Law Country?: A Conversation on Unpublished, Depublished, Withdrawn and Per Curiam 
Opinions (Mar. 18, 2005) [hereinafter Alito Symposium Address], available at 
http://www.law.com/pdf/dc/alito_unpublished.pdf. 
 41 See Cleveland, supra note 1, at 63, 64 n.15. 
 42 BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 4, at 37. 
 43 Thomas E. Baker, A Generation Spent Studying the United States Courts of Appeals: A 
Chronology, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 395, 396 (2000). 
 44 CARRINGTON, supra note 15, at Preface.  
 45 Id.; see also BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 4, at 34.  “[T]he report . 
. .  recommended some intramural reforms to improve efficiency, recommended an increase in 
capacity and, most importantly, proposed a sequential strategy for dealing with anticipated 
federal appellate growth over the long run.”  Id.  
 46 Thomas E. Baker made an excellent distinction between reforms which the court itself 
takes and those that require the action of the political branches to accomplish.  He calls these 
categories, “intramural” and “extramural.”  I have adopted “internal” and “external” instead; 
while I am uncertain whether these words are better, they are at least adequate, and I am 
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In 1972, a Study Group commissioned by the Federal Judicial Center and headed 
by Professor Paul Freund issued a report primarily focused on the caseload of the 
U.S. Supreme Court.47  It was, however, the report’s comments regarding the 
intermediate appellate structure that drew the most attention and criticism.48  The 
report proposed the creation of a national court of appeals, which would screen 
cases, resolve inter-circuit conflicts, and recommend a limited number of cases for 
the U.S. Supreme Court for possible grant of certiorari.49  The court would be staffed 
by seven circuit judges sitting by appointment for staggered terms.50  The proposal 
was widely criticized and seemingly dead on arrival, but it did shine some light on 
the problem of volume in the federal appellate courts as well as reveal the difficulty 
with making a principled reform.51 
                                                           
certain that they are mine.  Thomas E. Baker, An Assessment of Past Extramural Reforms of 
the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 28 GA. L. REV. 863, 863–64 (1994). 
 47 1972 REPORT, supra note 32; Hufstedler, supra note 15, at 796–800 (stating that the 
new court would provide significant immediate relief to the Supreme Court of the United 
States); BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 4, at 35; see also Wallace, supra 
note 3, at 914.  
 48 BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 4, at 35 (citing Kevin L. Domecus, 
Congressional Prerogatives, The Constitution and a National Court of Appeals, 5 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 715, 716 n.7 (1978)); see also Hufstedler, supra note 15, at 796–97, 799 
(discussing how the early critics of the National Court of Appeals saw such proposal as simply 
a “work relief bill for the individual Justices of the Supreme Court” and how the national 
court of appeals would not solve the problems of congestion that the federal appellate courts 
are facing); Wallace, supra note 3, at 914.  The proposed national court of appeals was one of 
the most controversial proposals in history.  The proposal “sparked several years of intense, 
often emotional, debate and provoked several sitting Justices of the Supreme Court to take 
public position, both pro and con.”  Id.  
 49 1972 REPORT, supra note 32, at 47; see also Hufstedler, supra note 15, at 796; BAKER, 
RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 4, at 35; POSNER, supra note 1, at 162–63.   
 50 1972 REPORT, supra note 32, at 19; BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 
4, at 35; Hufstedler, supra note 15, at 799 (Hufstedler noted that a panel of seven judges 
would be the most effective number because no panel should be comprised of an even number 
of judges.  A panel of three judges would not work because that is the number used for the 
normal court of appeals’ panel, and the panel should not be as large as nine because it would 
mirror the Supreme Court of the United States).   
 51 Daniel J. Meador, The Federal Judiciary—Inflation, Malfunction, and a Proposed 
Course of Action, 1981 BYU L. REV 617 (1981); Hufstedler, supra note 15, at 797 (The 
proposal was greeted with “firestorms of protest.”). 
The lightning bolt that struck and severely damaged the Freund Committee report was 
the report’s recommendation to remove the Supreme Court’s unfettered power to 
exercise discretion in selecting its docket.  The proposal pulled the hands of the 
Supreme Court Justices from the valve controlling the flow of cases to the Supreme 
Court and substituted those of judges on the new court.  Moreover, the Freund 
proposal, in addition to having the new court select plausible candidates for review, 
would also have eliminated access to the Supreme Court for all non-selected cases. 
Id; see also BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 4, at 35 (referring to the 
proposal as “stillborn” upon its arrival); Wallace, supra note 3, at 914. 
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With the attention of the federal bar and judiciary now focused on the issue of 
volume pressures in the federal courts, Congress created the Commission on 
Revision of the Federal Courts Appellate System in 1972.52  The Commission, under 
Senator Hruska, was charged with proposing systemic and structural reforms for the 
“expeditious and effective disposition of judicial business.”53  The Hruska 
Commission, as it came to be known, issued two reports, which proposed division of 
the Fifth and Ninth Circuits and renewed the proposal for creation of a national 
appeals court, this one staffed by seven new permanent Article III judges who would 
hear cases only by referral from the Supreme Court.54  The Fifth Circuit was 
eventually split, but the other proposals were not enacted despite the intense study 
and thoughtful efforts of the Committee and the involvement of all three branches of 
government.55  
The Hruska Commission’s Report was largely supported by the ABA, and over 
the next decade, the ABA made its own recommendations for internal reforms aimed 
at improving processing efficiency and other procedural changes within the existing 
                                                           
 52 Act of Oct. 13, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-489, 86 Stat. 407 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of Title 5 of the United States Code).  Congress acted at the urging of a number of 
key individuals and groups including Chief Justice Warren Burger, the Chief Judges of the 
Federal Circuits, the Judicial Conference, the Federal Judicial Center, and the ABA.  See 
BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 4, at 36; Hufstedler, supra note 15, at 797 
(discussing how Chief Justice Warren Burger was a strong advocate of creating a new court 
and how he pushed for reform).   
 53 BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 4, at 36.  The Hruska Commission 
identified four problems with the federal judiciary system: (1) intercircuit conflicts that had 
gone unresolved, (2) delay, (3) the Supreme Court of the United States’s burden in having to 
hear cases unworthy of its resources, and (4) conflicts in federal law, which caused 
uncertainty in litigants, lawyers, and the nation as a whole.  Wallace, supra note 3, at 926.  
 54 Comm’n on Revision of the Fed. Court Appellate Sys., The Geographical Boundaries 
of the Several Judicial Circuits: Recommendations for Change, 62 F.R.D. 223 (1973); 
Comm’n on Revision of the Fed. Court Appellate Sys., Structure and Internal Procedures: 
Recommendations for Change, 67 F.R.D. 195 (1975); BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL, 
supra note 4, at 36.  The renewed proposal to create a national court of appeals arose from the 
need to “‘assure consistency and uniformity by resolving conflicts between circuits.’”  
Wallace, supra note 3, at 914 (quoting Structure and Internal Procedures: Recommendations 
for Change, 67 F.R.D. 195 (1975)).  Wallace notes, however, that not all inter-circuit conflicts 
are necessarily evils that the federal judiciary should seek to avoid. 
If all intercircuit conflicts are evils that should be avoided at all cost, then there can be 
no objective reason to oppose a national court of appeals modeled along the lines 
proposed by the Hruska Commission—one that would resolve intercircuit conflicts in 
cases by “reference” from the Supreme Court or by “transfer” from the present courts 
of appeals.  But it is not clear that there is anything intrinsically unacceptable about 
conflicts.  Indeed, if conflicts were by their very nature unacceptable, the traditional 
rule denying precedential status to out-of-circuit decisions probably would not have 
enjoyed its long history.  Conflicts among the circuits appear to embody a subtle 
mixture of both good and bad aspects.   
Id.  
 55 BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 4, at 36. 
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courts.56  The United States Justice Department, on the other hand, made a series of 
much broader proposals including eliminating diversity jurisdiction, creating 
administrative courts, and the creation of a permanent body for coordinating court 
reform drawn from all branches of government.57  The Justice Department also 
pushed for structural reforms such as the use of federal magistrates and the creation 
of a subject matter-specific appellate court, both of which were enacted.58 
In 1989, the ABA reviewed the progress since its 1968 Report and reiterated the 
need for reform.  The ABA’s experts viewed reform as an inevitable necessity and 
broadened the ABA’s prior proposals to include the creation of additional subject 
matter circuits, the creation of subject matter panels within circuits, and the study 
screening devices to limit cases.59   
In late 1988, the Federal Courts Study Committee was created by Congress, and 
its members were appointed by Chief Justice Rehnquist.60  This fifteen-member 
committee included representatives of all the stakeholders in the federal appellate 
system, and it cast a wide net regarding public opinion, even holding public 
meetings and hearings.61  In its Final Report, the Committee concluded that the need 
for reform was obvious and inescapable.62  To a majority of the committee, a “crisis 
of volume” existed, would continue to grow, and required a “fundamental change.”63  
The Committee proposed a host of possible reforms and urged further action by 
those empowered to enact such reforms—Congress and the courts.64  The Committee 
discussed, without endorsing, several sweeping structural changes including:  1) 
elimination of the existing circuits in favor of more numerous and smaller regional 
courts; 2) creation of an additional intermediate appellate court above the regional 
courts, which would have a discretionary docket and absorb some of the Supreme 
Court’s conflict resolution and law-declaring duties; 3) creation of national subject 
                                                           
 56 Id. at 37; see also Meador, supra note 51, at 617, 628–29; Parker & Hagin, supra note 
2, at 213 (An inefficient judicial system “endangers the basic principles of our national justice 
resource: quality resolution of our country’s most fundamental, important, and complex legal 
concerns.”).  
 57 DEP’T OF JUSTICE COMM. ON REVISION OF THE FED. JUDICIAL SYS., THE NEEDS OF THE 
FEDERAL COURTS (1977). 
 58 The Federal Magistrate Act of 1979, Pub L. No. 96-82, 93 Stat. 643 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of Title 28 of the United States Code); The Federal Courts 
Improvement Act of 1982, Pub L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of Title 28 United States Code). 
 59 AM. BAR ASSOC. STANDING COMM. ON FED. JUDICIAL IMPROVEMENTS, THE UNITED 
STATES COURTS OF APPEALS:  REEXAMINING STRUCTURE AND PROGRESS AFTER A CENTURY OF 
GROWTH (1989); BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 5, at 158–59.  
 60 Federal Courts Study Act, Pub. L. No 100-702, § 102, 102 Stat. 4644 (1988) (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of  Title 28  of the United States Code); see also BAKER, 
RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 4, at 40–41. 
 61 Federal Courts Study Act, Pub. L. No 100-702, § 102, 102 Stat. 4644 (1988) (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of  Title 28  of the United States Code). 
 62 1990 REPORT, supra note 2.  
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. at 3, 171–85. 
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matter courts or subject matter panels within existing circuits; 4) merger of all 
existing circuits into a single national appellate court; 5) combining of the existing 
circuits into fewer, larger units similar to the Ninth Circuit; 6) more formal review of 
judicial workload, judgeship creation and selection, and internal case management 
reforms.65  While substantive changes to the law were outside the Committee’s 
purview, it did suggest the repeal of diversity jurisdiction, reform of prisoner 
litigation, and elimination of duplication of state and federal criminal cases.66 
At the request of the Federal Courts Study Committee, the Federal Judicial 
Center (FJC) conducted a study of the “full range of structural reforms” on appellate 
workload.67  In 1993, the FJC issued its report, finding that federal judges were near 
evenly divided on key questions such as whether the courts had streamlined things 
through internal reforms as far as they could before sacrificing the quality of 
appellate decision-making and whether there was over-reliance on court staff.68  
Based on its own analysis, the FJC determined that none of the proposed structural 
changes would significantly decrease the quantity of case filings, but it abstained 
when it came to addressing the core question of whether these reforms would 
improve or ensure the quality of appellate justice because it found that question too 
subjective.69  While the report does an excellent job cataloguing and describing 
various reforms, both structural and jurisdictional,70 it ultimately concludes that the 
federal courts’ volume problem “derives primarily from the continuing expansion of 
federal jurisdiction without a concomitant increase in resources.  It does not appear 
to be a stress that would be significantly relieved by structural change to the 
appellate system at this time.”71  So, while the report is well-detailed and broad in the 
reforms it reviewed, it demonstrates an unwillingness to choose sides in the 
crisis/non-crisis debate and refusal to accept any solution, the benefits of which 
cannot be objectively measured. 
Other inquiries into judicial resources and rulemaking have addressed the issue, 
albeit on a smaller scale or with more specific focus.72  In addition, there is a wealth 
of scholarly discussion on federal court reform.73 
                                                           
 65 Id. at 118–23. 
 66 Id. at 14–16. 
 67 FED. JUDICIAL CTR., STRUCTURAL AND OTHER ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 
OF APPEALS: REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS AND THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE 
UNITED STATES 1 (1993); see also BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 4, at 
40–41 (discussing the formation of the Committee, its purpose, and its Final Report).   
 68 FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 67, at 37, 52. 
 69 Id. at 9, 105.  
 70 BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 4, at 42–43 (discussing the 
possibility of the following reforms: redrawing circuit boundaries, creating an additional 
appellate tier, creating national subject matter courts, merging all of the existing courts of 
appeals into a single centrally-organized court, and consolidating the existing circuits into 
“jumbo circuits”).   
 71 Id. at 155. 
 72 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMM. ON COURT ADMIN. & CASE MGMT, REPORT TO THE 
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON LONG RANGE PLANNING 10 (1995) [hereinafter LONG 
RANGE PLANNING]; see also Thomas E. Baker & Frank H. Easterbrook, A Self-Study of 
Federal Judicial Rulemaking: A Report from the Subcommittee on Long Range Planning to 
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Internal reforms have been plentiful but not without cost.  Streamlining case 
management, putting greater authority in the hands of staff, and forgoing the 
publication and precedential value of most of the federal circuits’ decisions have 
resulted in a significantly more efficient process but at the cost of core values of 
appellate decision-making.  As one experienced federal court reform expert 
describes it:  
Today, most of us seem to be content in believing that the courts of 
appeals survived the “crisis of volume,” whether it was real or imagined.  
The courts have maintained an appellate equilibrium:  They manage to 
decide about as many appeals as are filed each year.  This is important 
and significant.  Cases are not queuing up on the docket, although 
disposition times have increased appreciably.  Furthermore, we now take 
for granted what were once characterized as “emergency” procedures.  
We have lowered our expectations for appellate procedure.  We have 
defined down our appellate values.  We have all internalized the post-
modern norms of minimalist procedural paradigm.74 
External reforms, such as major restructuring or altering the federal courts’ 
jurisdiction, have not been forthcoming, likely because those changes would have to 
be imposed on the courts by Congress, and the changes are viewed as too radical.75  
While many have backed off of the “crisis” verbiage, most still acknowledge a large 
and growing caseload in the federal courts.76  Resolving this problem seems to be a 
bit like trying to fix a snag in a tapestry; there are a number of threads that could be 
pulled, but doing so would have uncertain results on both the problem thread and 
                                                           
the Committee on Rules of Practice, Procedure and Evidence of the Judicial Conference of the 
United States, 168 F.R.D. 679 (1995); FINAL REPORT, supra note 2. 
 73 See, e.g., Arthur D. Hellman, The Crisis in the Circuits and the Innovations of the 
Browning Years, in RESTRUCTURING JUSTICE (Arthur D. Hellman ed., 1990); BAKER, 
RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 4; JOHN P. FRANK, AMERICAN LAW: A CASE FOR 
RADICAL REFORM (1969); POSNER, supra note 1; Dragich, supra note 1. 
 74 Baker, supra note 8, at 113–14 (citing Thomas E. Baker & Denis J. Hauptly, Taking 
Another Measure of the "Crisis of Volume" in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 51 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 97 (1994)). 
 75 See Dragich, supra note 1, at 16. 
Broadly speaking, reforms aimed at reducing the flow of cases rely on Congress to 
restrict the jurisdiction of the federal courts by statute, or on the Supreme Court to 
restrict jurisdiction through abstention, the justiciability doctrines, and similar devices.  
 
Of course, systemic reforms are outside the courts’ power to impose, leaving them at 
the mercy of a Congress that so far remains unpersuaded of the need for decisive 
action. 
Id. at 16–18 (emphasis added); see also FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE 
BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY SYSTEM 56–102 
(1928); Carolyn Dineen King, Commentary, A Matter of Conscience, 28 HOUS. L. REV. 955, 
956 (1991).  
 76 BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 4, at  31–32.  See generally Dragich, 
supra note 1; POSNER, supra note 1.  
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elsewhere on the tapestry.  There has been reluctance to do any but the most minor 
tweaking, but as the snag grows and threatens to continue to grow, undermining the 
integrity of the entire garment, something must be done.77 
II.  METHODS FOR DEALING WITH VOLUME 
Many methods for dealing with the volume problem have been proposed or 
examined by various organizations, studies, and individuals.78  This section collects 
them, regardless of size, shape, or era, and highlights the perceived strengths and 
weaknesses of those reforms, particularly in regard to the values of appellate 
decision-making each serves or disserves.79  
A.  Methods in Use 
There have been many changes to the courts’ internal practices, which have 
resulted in a more efficient processing of appeals.80  These internal changes have 
decreased the burden of increased caseloads but at some cost to the traditional 
appellate values of access, fairness, and accountability.81  Indeed, while the 
appearance of business as usual has been maintained, internal changes made since 
the early 1970s have altered appellate justice.82 
                                                           
 77 “In 1945, litigants appealed about one of every forty district court terminations; they 
now appeal about one in eight.  As a result, appellate filings have risen nearly fifteen-fold.”  
1990 REPORT, supra note 3, at 110.  Additionally, case filings in the courts of appeals have 
risen from about 30,000 in 1983 to over 56,000 in 2010.  POSNER, supra note 1, at 64; see also 
U.S. COURTS, STATISTICAL TABLES FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: APPEALS COMMENCED, 
TERMINATED, AND PENDING tbl.B (2010), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/2010/tables/B00Mar1
0.pdf.  
 78 COMM’N ON REVISION OF FED. COURT APPELLATE SYS., STRUCTURE AND INTERNAL 
PROCEDURES:  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE (1975), reprinted in 67 F.R.D. 195; Shafroth, 
supra note 1; 1990 REPORT, supra note 1. 
 79 Hopefully, this can serve as a potential resource for those interested in the full range of 
possible reforms or perhaps for the benefit of the next inevitable federal appellate court study. 
It is inherently descriptive in nature rather than prescriptive. 
 80 FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 67, at 37; BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra 
note 4, at 138–224.  
 81 Robel, supra note 5, at 4; CARRINGTON, MEADOR & ROSENBERG, supra note 1, at v; 
McCree, supra note 1, at 778; Dragich, supra note 1, at 13; Gizzi, supra note 15; Pether, 
supra note 28, at 10. 
 82 Justice Samuel Alito, then a Third Circuit Judge, noted:  
[I]t struck me that the judges of the early 1970s, mostly World War II veterans, had 
responded to the tremendous increase in the appellate caseload with the same 
uncomplaining, can-do attitude that their generation had displayed as young men.  
They quickly identified a number of techniques that permitted the courts of appeals to 
keep up with their cases without seeming to make fundamental alterations in their 
mode of operation. 
Alito Symposium Address, supra note 40.  
2013] POST-CRISIS RECONSIDERATION 63 
 
1.  Unpublished Opinions  
One early internal reform adopted by the circuit courts was the creation of system 
of limited publication of case decisions.83  In early 1973, the Committee on the Use 
of Appellate Energy, a subgroup of the Judicial Conference’s Advisory Council on 
Appellate Justice, recommended the non-publication of some opinions, along with 
an explicit limitation on their citation and an implicit denial of their precedential 
value.84  The 1973 Committee perceived a burgeoning problem with increasing 
caseloads and, in particular, the time it would take judges to produce and lawyers to 
research the growing number of written opinions.85  What was devised to address 
this cost was a system by which a court could differentiate between its error-
correcting function and its law-declaring function.86  Cases that merely corrected 
                                                           
 83 See generally William R. Richman, An Evaluation of Limited Publication in the United 
States Courts of Appeals: The Price of Reform, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 573 (1981); Daniel N. 
Hoffman, Nonpublication of Federal Appellate Court Opinions, 6 JUST. SYS. J. 405 (1981); 
Cleveland, supra note 1.  See also CARRINGTON, MEADOR & ROSENBERG, supra note 1, at 35–
41; McCree, supra note 1, at 789; Martha J, Dragich, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals 
Perish if they Publish? Or Does the Declining Use of Opinions to Explain and Justify Judicial 
Decisions Pose a Greater Threat?, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 757, 760 (1995); Robel, supra note 5, at 
49–50 (by 1990, only a few federal appeals courts published even half of their decisions on 
the merits.).   
 84 ADVISORY COUNCIL ON APPELLATE JUSTICE, supra note 39; BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE 
ON APPEAL, supra note 4, at 37; POSNER, supra note 1, at 122 (“With the rapid increase during 
the 1960s in the number of appeals, both absolute and relative to the number of judges, the 
practice of universal publication began to be questioned.”); Cleveland, supra note 1, at 63–64. 
 85 See generally ADVISORY COUNCIL ON APPELLATE JUSTICE, supra note 39.  
 86 Dragich, supra note 1, at 15, 22–23 (The dual functions of the courts of appeals has 
weakened the federal judicial structure because the courts must take the time to resolve cases 
and set legal precedent, leading to a “reduction in the attention paid to each case.”).  
Additionally, Dragich notes, “the courts are unable to perform either function well,” which 
begs the need to differentiate between the courts’ error-correcting function and law-making 
function.  Id.; see also Parker & Hagin, supra note 2, at 235 (arguing that the error-correcting 
function and the law-giving function of the appellate courts do not always deserve the same 
treatment).  But see CARRINGTON, MEADOR & ROSENBERG, supra note 1, at 2–4 (discussing 
how “the line between the two functions has not been easy to maintain” and how it might be 
harmful or even futile to try and maintain such a line).  See also Carrington, supra note 3, at 
416–17.  During the late 1800s, no one even perceived the federal appellate courts as having a 
role in making law—the perceived role was simply to correct the errors of the courts below.  
Carrington suggests that some distinction should be made between the error-correcting and 
law-making functions of the appellate courts.  Id.  In 1925, federal appellate judges were still 
primarily engaged only in the error-correcting function, and this sole responsibility had its 
benefits. 
These judges were raised in the formalist traditions of [the] earlier time.  They took 
pride in the work of correcting error and enjoyed the time and space that enabled them 
to respond to individual party interests.  They could listen to arguments, carefully read 
transcripts, examine the precedents for themselves, hold unhurried conferences among 
themselves, and fully and directly explain their decisions to the interested bar.  These 
courts, working so visibly themselves, could be counted upon to accept the direction 
of the higher Court and to bring any idiosyncratic district judge into line as well.  Not 
only the Supreme Court had such expectations of the courts of appeals judges, but the 
lawyers and district judges had such expectations as well.  Those district court judges 
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error below and simply applied the law as it presently existed would be issued as 
“unpublished” decisions, while cases that expanded, contracted, or otherwise made 
new law would be published as usual.87  
The Committee correctly perceived that the lack of formal publication would not 
prevent private publishers from printing or lawyers from researching and citing such 
opinions, however designated, and so decided to add a citation ban on such 
opinions.88  This ban, the Committee believed, would eliminate the market for such 
opinions.89  While it correctly identified the persistence of the bench in bar in using 
judicial opinions regardless of their “publication” designation, it underestimated the 
enduring value the legal system placed on these opinions, and, eventually, the non-
citation rule was abolished.90  
The final question before the Committee, the true jurisprudential question, was 
whether such unpublished, unciteable opinions would still be accorded their usual 
precedential value.91  This question was deemed “a morass of jurisprudence,” and the 
Committee eschewed addressing the issue.92  This was a fundamental alteration to 
the common law method.93  But it was a method of addressing caseload volume 
because it did not require significant structural reform and could be accomplished 
without significant visible change in the courts’ operations.94  
                                                           
and lawyers could often accurately predict what to expect from the court of appeals in 
a particular case.  They knew which circuit judges would have the inclination and 
opportunity to assure that the district court adhered to the Supreme Court’s 
precedents, at least to the extent that the circuit judges could comprehend the Court’s 
opinions. . . .  
 
The work of correction takes time that circuit judges no longer feel they have.  And 
making the performance of that work visible and convincing to the bar and the public 
requires much more time than the judges are allowed by circumstance.  Accordingly, 
the error correction function of courts of appeals must be less influential in the daily 
work of district courts where individual fates are resolved.   
Id. at 423–25.  
 87 See POSNER, supra note 1, at 120 (various criteria were used to identify whether an 
opinion would likely have precedential value); Cleveland, supra note 1, at 63.  
 88 See Cleveland, supra note 1, at 63–64. 
 89 ADVISORY COUNCIL ON APPELLATE JUSTICE, supra note 39; Cleveland, supra note 1, at 
64, 102, 166-67 (Even with the citation ban, attorneys still researched unpublished opinions.  
In other words, attorneys continued to rely on unpublished opinions although they were not 
allowed to cite to such opinions.) (citing TIM REAGAN ET AL., CITATIONS TO UNPUBLISHED 
OPINIONS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS 10 (Fed. Judicial Ctr. 2005); Lauren Robel, 
The Practice of Precedent: Anastasoff, Noncitation Rules, and the Meaning of Precedent in an 
Interpretive Community, 35 IND. L. REV. 399, 401, 414 (2002).   
 90 FED. R. APP. P. 32.1. 
 91 ADVISORY COUNCIL ON APPELLATE JUSTICE, supra note 39. 
 92 Id.  
 93 Cleveland, supra note 1, at 68; Dragich, supra note 83, at 758 (published opinions are at 
the heart of our nation’s common law system). 
 94 Alito Symposium Address, supra note 40. 
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Issuance of unpublished opinions does undoubtedly improve efficiency, largely 
by designating some cases as resolvable by court staff that typically draft opinions 
not designated for formal publication.95  In fact, as the caseload increased, so has the 
percentage of cases decided by unpublished opinion.96  But this efficiency has come 
at the cost of reducing the active, informed consideration and decision by a panel of 
Article III judges to relegating those judges to being mere signatories to decisions 
that at least, in some cases, are akin to “sausages not fit for human consumption.”97  
This method of dealing with volume also undermines fairness by allowing for 
decisions that are relevant only for a single time and place, which removes the 
consistency safeguard of the common law—precedent.98  Already, the market has 
overcome the limitation on publication, and pragmatic and jurisprudential concerns 
have eliminated the bar on citation.99  What remains is the question of whether such 
opinions remain non-precedential and whether, in the face of full publication and 
citation, the cost savings of creating a second tier of cases remains significant.  This 
procedural shortcut must be acknowledged as harmful to the appellate process and 
ended.100 
                                                           
 95 POSNER, supra note 1, at 124.  
 96 See Cleveland, supra note 1, at 63, 108.  
 97 Alex Kozinski, In Opposition to Proposed Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1, 
51 FED. LAW. 36, 37 (June 2004); Cleveland, supra note 1, at 124.   
 98 Cleveland, supra note 1, at 146–48, 155–60. 
 99 Id. at 160. 
The unpublished decisions of the federal courts of appeals are now uniformly citeable 
thanks to new Rule 32.1.  Such decisions are widely available in the Federal 
Appendix, on West's and LEXIS's online services, and on the courts' own websites.  
Even with citation restrictions in place, past practice suggests that these opinions will 
be looked at and used.  If anything, society has pushed back against the encroachment 
on this traditional common law protection.  Nor have any adequate alternate 
procedures been substituted.  It is difficult to imagine what alternative procedure 
could be substituted to meaningfully replace the ability of litigants to rely upon a 
court's following its decisions from one case to the next absent some factual 
distinctions or changes in the law. 
Id. 
 100 Martha Dragich, a proponent of published opinions has stated: 
The published judicial opinion is at the “heart of the common law system.”  Judicial 
opinions are a critical component of what we understand to be the “law.”  In fact, a 
legal system’s existence cannot be recognized “until the decisions of [its] courts are 
regularly published and are available to the bench and bar.”  To the extent our “law” is 
embodied in precedents, published opinions are the authoritative sources of law.  
Indeed, stare decisis cannot operate in the absence of published opinions.   
Dragich, supra note 83, at 758 (quoting John Reid, Doe Did Not Sit—The Creation of 
Opinions by an Artist, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 59, 59 (1963); GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF 
AMERICAN LAW 9 (1977).  But see Robel, supra note 5, at 50 (arguing that limited publication 
is the most effective method in saving the courts’ time and energy).   
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2.  Increased Reliance on Staff 
Another internal reform used by federal circuits to deal with the increase in 
caseload volume is an increased reliance on court staff.101  There has been an 
increase in number and importance of both the appellate judges’ personal clerks 
(“elbow clerks”) and central staff that serves the entire circuit court of appeals.102  In 
addition to a numerical increase, the decisional and law-making power of court staff 
has increased.103  Court staff are now the captains of case management and often de 
facto decisionmakers.104  While the courts do employ administrative staff to handle 
non-judicial tasks like schedule setting, filing, and typing, they have also 
increasingly employed decision-making staff whose responsibilities include making 
recommended judicial decisions, tracking and weighting cases in ways that dictate 
the amount of judicial attention they receive, and selecting the precise words in 
which the decision is rendered.105  They set and manage the briefing and argument 
schedule, administering pre-hearing conferences to narrow issues and encourage 
resolution, virtually rule on motions and grants of oral argument via proposed 
decisions and pre-drafted orders, propose decisions, and draft opinions (particularly 
unpublished opinions) that hand down the court’s decisions.106  
                                                           
 101 See Posner, supra note 4, at 765, 767–75; see also McCree, supra note 1, at 782, 785; 
BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 4, at 139–47 (discussing different staffing 
arrangements and how court staff members represent “the first line of defense against 
oppressive dockets”); POSNER, supra note 1, at 97, 102–19.  But see John G. Kester, The Law 
Clerk Explosion, 9 LITIG. 20 (1983) (expressing deep concern over the use of this method as a 
way of coping with the caseload problem).  
 102 BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 4, at 140; CARRINGTON, MEADOR & 
ROSENBERG, supra note 1, at 44; POSNER, supra note 1, at 97 (“There has been a big 
expansion in the number of law clerks, and the creation of a kind of floating law clerk called a 
staff attorney.”); McCree, supra note 1, at 785.  
 103 Dragich, supra note 1, at 31; POSNER, supra note 1, at 104.  See generally E. Wright, 
Observations of an Appellate Judge: The Use of Law Clerks, 26 VAND. L. REV. 1179 (1973); 
DANIEL J. MEADOR, APPELLATE COURTS: STAFF AND PROCESS IN THE CRISIS OF VOLUME 
(1974); Posner, supra note 4, at 768; McCree, supra note 1, at 785–86 (citing Paul R. Baier, 
The Law Clerks: Profile of an Institution, 26 VAND. L. REV. 1125, 1128–37 (1973); Chester A. 
Newland, Personal Assistants to Supreme Court Justices: The Law Clerks, 40 OR. L. REV. 
299, 300–05 (1961)).  
 104 Posner, supra note 4, at 768 (arguing that appellate judges may still direct staff 
members and give orders, but the staff members are ultimately the decision-makers).  Some 
scholars even go as far as to call these staff members para-judges and invisible judges.  Id. at 
770 (quoting Alvin B. Rubin, Views from the Lower Court, 23 UCLA L. REV. 448, 456 
(1976)); Wilkinson III, supra note 1, at 1171–72.   
 105 BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 4, at 139–41; Posner, supra note 4 at 
768, 770 (noting that the role of the appellate judge has transformed from draftsman to editor).  
Although the judge has the final say in the wording of a decision written by a staff member, 
the staff member’s ideals and opinions are still very much prevalent in such decision.  It is 
inevitable that the drafter of the decision will have a large impact on the final product.  Id. at 
770.   
 106 See BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 4, at 139–45; Wilkinson III, 
supra note 2, at 1171; Shirley M. Hufstedler, The Appellate Process Inside Out, 50 CAL. ST. 
B.J. 20, 22 (1975); see also Robel, supra note 5, at 43.  
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Judges’ personal clerks107 are typically new law school graduates who lack 
experience but are drawn from the tops of their classes at top law schools.108  What 
they lack in experience, they make up for in intelligence, eagerness, and low pay 
requirements.  Their position is transient, typically lasting only a term or two,109 and 
they are under close supervision of the judge for which they work.110  Court staff, 
particularly the decision-making staff attorneys,111 are typically experienced 
appellate attorneys in a career position.  They work outside the chambers of any 
individual judges and have a greater role in proposing outcomes.112   
                                                           
 107 Up until the past few decades, judges only had one law clerk whose “role was ‘testing 
the judge’s work’ by criticizing opinion drafts and arguments, and acting generally as a 
sounding board.”  BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 4, at 140–41 (citing 
Wade H. McCree, Bureaucratic Justice:  An Early Warning, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 777, 786–87 
(1981)).  With the caseload increase, though, second and third law clerks were added to help 
judges deal with the volume.  BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 4, at 141.  In 
the past, law clerks were merely considered “go-fors” and “sounding boards.”  POSNER, supra 
note 1, at 104–05.  Now, they participate heavily in the opinion-drafting process because 
opinion drafting is the most time-consuming delegable judicial task.  Id.; CARRINGTON, 
MEADOR & ROSENBERG, supra note 1, at 32 (Opinion-drafting is the most expensive and time-
consuming phase of the judicial process.).   
 108 POSNER, supra note 1, at 102, 107; see also Robel, supra note 5, at 41.   
 109 See POSNER, supra note 1, at 102 (law clerks generally only serve under a particular 
judge for one to two years).   
 110 Posner argues that there is not always close supervision of law clerks:  “If [the judge] 
has only one or two [law clerks], problems of supervision and delegation are unlikely to be 
serious.  But if [the judge] has three of four clerks, a significant amount of his time must be 
spent in supervising and coordinating their work.”  POSNER, supra note 1, at 103.  As a result, 
the judge is left with less time for his or her conventional judicial duties.  Id. at 103–04; 
BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 4, at 144–45 (Judges are unable to 
adequately supervise their clerks because there are simply too many.).  By limiting the number 
of clerks to one or two, judges will be more capable of closely supervising their clerks and 
perform their conventional judicial duties.   
 111 The duties of the staff attorney traditionally include, but are not limited to, the 
following: 
(1) Acquiring a case once the notice of appeal is filed; 
(2) Carries the case through each procedural step until the closing brief has been 
submitted; 
(3) Prepares legal memoranda; 
(4) Drafts proposed opinions; 
(5) Recommends the grant or denial or oral argument; and 
(6) Presents everything to the judge in the end for the final decision 
Hufstedler, supra note 106, at 22; see also Robel, supra note 5, at 43 (for further discussion on 
staff attorney duties).   
 112 See Baker, supra note 6, at 144; see also BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra 
note 4, at 139 (Their greater role in proposing outcomes stems from their duty to perform 
prescreening assessments of appeals.).  
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The courts’ reliance on central staff is undeniable and seemingly necessary.113  
Yet, critics of the practice suggest that too much decision-making power has been 
placed in the hands of staff.114  Duties such as approving or denying oral argument, 
granting or denying a motion, making the initial judgment on the outcome of an 
appeal, and drafting the precise language that will become law, are viewed as 
essential appellate judicial functions.115  Court staff making such decisions, even 
when reviewed by a judge, seems contrary to the fundamental appellate value that 
litigants have their case decided by an Article III judge.116  Moreover, some have 
expressed a concern that the sorcerer’s apprentices are loose in the workshop:  “it is 
the work of these usually newly-graduated lawyers that produces many widespread 
and troubling inequality effects.”117  To create some guidance for staff in tracking 
appeals, categories of cases, not individual cases, are examined to be placed on the 
short list for actual judicial consideration or to be thrown in the pile of less carefully 
considered and drafted opinions.118  The practice of relying so heavily on staff to 
make essentially judicial decisions is an abdication of the judicial function in large 
categories of cases.119 
                                                           
 113 See Donald P. Ubell, Evolution and Role of Appellate Court Central Staff Attorneys, 2 
T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 157, 166 (1984) (“Central staff attorneys are here to stay, without 
question.  The reasons that gave birth to their existence remain.  Filings continue to increase 
and the prospect for new judgeships is limited.”); POSNER, supra note 1, at 103 (“[T]he 
caseload per federal judge has risen to the point where very few judges, however able and 
dedicated, can keep up with the flow without heavy reliance on law clerks, staff attorneys, and 
sometimes externs too.”).  
 114 See BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 4, at 140–41 (Many 
commentators worry that “the law clerk’s role in the reading, studying, considering, and 
writing has encroached significantly on that of the judge.”); POSNER, supra note 1, at 104–07 
(judges have delegated more and more of the initial opinion-drafting duties to law clerks, 
transforming the judge into an editor from his traditional role as draftsman).  In many 
situations, law clerks have been considered “para-judges” or “invisible judges” because all of 
the judicial duties they have taken on over the course of the years.  Id. at 106 (citing Alvin B. 
Rubin, Views from the Lower Court, 23 UCLA L. REV. 448, 456 (1976)); McCree, supra note 
4, at 787 (“Rather than critiquing and testing judicial work, clerks may come to perform this 
work themselves.”); Robel, supra note 5, at 41–42.  
 115 See Patricia M. Wald, The Problem with the Courts: Black Robed Bureaucracy, or 
Collegiality Under Challenge?, 42 MD. L. REV. 766 (1983); see also POSNER, supra note 1, at 
103–13 (discussing the duties delegated to law clerks and staff attorneys); BAKER, RATIONING 
JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 4, at 144 (“Deciding whether a case deserves oral argument 
and how a case should be decided . . . lie at the core of judicial function.”).   
 116 As Thomas E. Baker puts it: “[j]udging is deciding; that is the exercise of the article III 
power.”  BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 4, at 141.  Increasing law clerks’ 
and staff attorneys’ duties inevitably grants them more power to make decisions concerning 
the outcome of cases; hence, litigants are not always afforded the opportunity to have their 
case decided by an Article III judge. 
 117 See Pether, supra note 28, at 10. 
 118 See id. at 13-14. 
 119 Id. at 14. 
2013] POST-CRISIS RECONSIDERATION 69 
 
As federal appellate court expert Thomas E. Baker explains, “these experiments 
represent uncomfortable choices made in the face of the daunting workload.”120  The 
choice has been made, and the efficiency gains are difficult to dispute.121  Proponents 
of increased use of court staff, and clearly the circuit courts themselves, believe that 
the benefits of the practice outweigh its harm.122  Still, we have reached or will soon 
reach the limit of volume pressures that additional court staff can ameliorate.  
Whether due to diminishing marginal utility or an inability of judges to supervise the 
bureaucracy, there is a limit to the tradeoff between benefit and harm that shifts 
unacceptably toward harm.123  Already, the Judicial Conference has taken note and 
adopted limits on the expansion of court staff.124  While it has addressed the 
numerical issue, the issue of appropriate decision-making power remains 
unresolved.125 
3.  Case Management/Tracking 
The related process of case management, including the tracking of cases into 
different categories of review, has also increased court efficiency and helped deal 
                                                           
 120 BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 4, at 143. 
 121 Baker, supra note 7, at 113–14 (“Today, most of us seem to be content in believing that 
the courts of appeals survived the ‘crisis of volume,’ whether it was real or imagined.  The 
courts have maintained an appellate equilibrium:  They manage to decide about as many 
appeals as are filed each year.”). 
 122 BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 4, at 144–45 (One benefit includes 
saving the judges’ time, which allows them to focus on the more important appellate tasks.  
One harm that so many critics discuss is that judges are no longer able to adequately supervise 
central staff members because there are simply too many.); POSNER, supra note 1, at 103–19 
(the use of law clerk and other staff members should not be considered a necessary evil, but 
the overuse of such staff members creates harms that outweigh any benefits). 
 123 Baker argues that the limits of delegation and supervision have been reached in most 
chambers, and great harm would come from multiplying judicial clerkships.  “Multiplying 
judicial clerkships any more would jeopardize the tradition that federal judges are respected 
and respectful because they do their own work.”  BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL, 
supra note 4, at 143 (citing CHARLES E. WYZANSKI, WHEREAS:  A JUDGE’S PREMISES 61 
(1965)); see also POSNER, supra note 1, at 116 (Increased reliance on staff threatens the 
quality of appointments to the federal bench—judges who are unable or unwilling to write can 
hide behind their staff, particularly their personal clerks.).      
 124 REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S. 68 (1981); 
REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 63 
(1991); BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 4, at 146 n.173. 
 125 Wade H. McCree has put it well: 
Delegation of some aspects of the judge’s work is essential, as is no doubt true of 
much of the work of many other public officials.  Such delegation appears particularly 
desirable against the background of overloaded dockets.  But we must not lose sight of 
the fundamental changes in the nature of the judicial enterprise that may accompany 
delegation of too many or too critical aspects of the judge’s work. 
McCree, supra note 1, at 789.  
70 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:47 
 
with the increased volume of appeals.126  Case management seeks to deal with 
volume in multiple ways including: (1) diverting some cases from any judicial 
attention by promoting resolution between the parties; (2) reducing the judicial 
attention needed by placing some cases on a staff disposition track; (3) reducing or 
removing the need for judicial attention to motions and procedural matters by 
resolving them at the staff level; and (4) improving the efficiency of judicial 
attention by narrowing the focus of the appeal and improving the quality of briefs 
and argument.127  This is true even where judges play a role in case management, 
though, typically the process is staff administered.128  
A key feature of case management is the pre-hearing conference.129  Early in the 
appeal, counsel meet with court staff to discuss the issues and process of the 
appeal.130  The staff attorney attempts to clarify and narrow the issues on appeal, 
explore the possibility of pre-hearing settlement, and set technical limits, such as 
scheduling or joint appendix contents, that will aid in resolution.131  Many case 
management programs have case diversion or pre-hearing resolution as a goal, and 
some go so far as to call them settlement conferences or to employ volunteer 
mediators.132  While case management plans and experiences with them have varied 
among the circuits, in general, they are reported as being successful at improving 
efficiency and the processing of cases.133 
Another aspect of case management is the weighting or tracking of cases.  This 
practice rests on the premise that not all cases are fungible nor do they all deserve 
the same process or treatment.134  A fairly benign form of weighting is the 
                                                           
 126 BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 4, at 135–36 (citing Jerry Goldman, 
The Civil Appeals Management Plan: An Experiment in Appellate Procedural Reform, 78 
COLUM. L. REV. 1209 (1978); Irving R. Kaufman, Must Every Appeal Run the Gamut?—The 
Civil Appeals Management Plan, 95 YALE L.J. 755 (1986); Irving R. Kaufman, New Remedies 
for the Next Century of Judicial Reform: Time as the Greatest Innovator, 57 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 253 (1988); Irving R. Kaufman, The Pre-Argument Conference: An Appellate 
Procedural Reform, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1094 (1974)).  Case management, however, has been 
subject to some criticism.  Skeptics argue that it is questionable whether managerial 
techniques truly reduce costs and increase efficiency and that judges who use case 
management techniques are ultimately deciding how much of the court resources a litigant 
should have access to.  Robel, supra note 5, at 17.  
 127 BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 4, at 136; see also Robel, supra note 
5, at 13–17.   
 128 BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 4, at 136. 
 129 Id.  
 130 Id. (conference generally takes place before briefing).  
 131 Id. at 136–37. 
 132 FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 67, at 40–42. 
 133 Id.; JAMES B. EAGLINE, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE PRE-ARGUMENT CONFERENCE 
PROGRAM IN THE SIXTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS 41–42 (1990) (stating the pre-hearing 
conferences (1) help in the settlement of cases; (2) make cases that do not settle more 
manageable due to the fact that the issues have already been narrowed and simplified; and (3) 
reduce delay and expenses).   
 134 This premise also underlies the practice of issuing unpublished opinions discussed 
above. 
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examination of each appeal and a staff assessment of the judicial time and effort 
involved.  This form of weighting helps to equalize caseload burdens of each panel 
and each judge, which in turn prevents backlog.  A more controversial type of 
weighting is one where some cases are placed on a track of lesser judicial 
consideration, often meaning no oral argument and a decision proposed and drafted 
by staff.  Here, the judicial role is reduced to reviewer and editor rather than 
decision-maker or opinion-crafter.  This is often used to deal with immigrants, 
asylum-seekers, “post-conviction criminal and civil rights appellants . . . the 
indigent, members of racial and ethnic minority groups, Social Security claimants, 
and other comparatively powerless individuals suing the federal government,” and 
other cases designated by staff as destined for unpublished opinions.135  Objections 
to this process echo those raised against the use of unpublished opinions and central 
staff more generally.  
Overall, case management is widely viewed as a net benefit in the war against 
volume, and like the use of central staff, it is likely to be continued and expanded to 
its outermost manageable limits. 
4.  Reduction of Oral Arguments 
One specific feature of appellate decision-making, oral argument, has been 
significantly reduced during the crisis of volume era.136  Oral argument is a relatively 
small portion of appellate judicial time, but it is a very visible component and one 
which reportedly alters the outcome in very few cases.137  In 1979, Federal Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 34 was amended to explicitly provide for oral argument in all 
cases unless a three-judge panel unanimously agrees that the case is:  1) frivolous; 2) 
adequately disposed of by recent decisions; or 3) may be adequately presented by 
written briefs.138  Despite the broad guarantee of oral argument and seemingly 
specific exceptions, oral argument is not the default position, or even the norm, in 
                                                           
 135 Pether, supra note 28, at 20. 
 136 See BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 4, at 108; McCree, supra note 1, 
at 782; CARRINGTON, MEADOR & ROSENBERG, supra note 1, at 16–24 (Courts now rely more 
on written submissions than on oral argument.); POSNER, supra note 1, at 119.  Posner 
discusses the importance and value of oral argument: 
Although the average quality of oral argument in federal courts (including the 
Supreme Court) is not high, the value of oral argument to judges is high.  This is not 
just because it gives the judge a chance to ask questions of counsel, though this is very 
important, but also because it provides a period of focused and active judicial 
consideration of the case.  The longer the argument, the more time the judge has to 
think about the case.  Of course there are diminishing returns to oral argument, and 
judges should not hesitate to terminate an argument when they no longer find it 
productive.  But the imposition of extremely short and stringent time limits, and the 
elimination of oral argument altogether in many cases where it would be productive    
. . . have been costly if perhaps inevitable adaptations to the caseload explosion.  
Id. at 119–20.  
 137 CARRINGTON, MEADOR & ROSENBERG, supra note 1, at 19 (noting that it is unlikely that 
any appellate court spends more than fifteen percent of its working time engaging in oral 
argument—for many courts, the amount of time spent is much less than fifteen percent). 
 138 FED. R. APP. P. 34; BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 4, at 108.  
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federal circuit courts today.139  The exceptions, particularly the final exception, have 
swallowed up the rule.  By 1994, “fewer than half the Court of Appeals hear[d] oral 
argument in half the appeals that they decide[d].”140  Today, that number is barely 
more than a quarter. 141  Not only has the frequency of oral argument dropped, so too 
has the duration of individual arguments.142  At a mere fifteen minutes per side, oral 
argument, even when granted, is greatly diminished.143  More troubling is that 
studies suggest that the grant of oral argument varies across subject matter144 and that 
cases where oral argument is granted are more likely to be reversed.145  Of course, 
these correlations do not prove causation, and perhaps some areas of law more 
commonly present frivolous, untenable, or easily briefed appeals.  
Even so, the reduction of oral argument does represent a significant reduction in 
appellate values, arguably for little gain.146  A 1993 Report of the Federal Judicial 
Center describes the value lost this way: 
                                                           
 139 CARRINGTON, MEADOR & ROSENBERG, supra note 1, at 16 (citing DANIEL J. MEADOR, 
CRIMINAL APPEALS:  ENGLISH PRACTICES AND AMERICAN REFORMS 71–80 (1973); Frederick B. 
Wiener, English and American Appeals Compared, 50 A.B.A. J. 635 (1964); D. KARLEN, 
APPELLATE COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND ENGLAND (1963)) (comparing the English 
tradition of dependence on oral argument to the reliance on written submissions in America).  
 140 BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 4, at 109; Robel, supra note 5, at 48. 
 141 Compare ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED 
STATES: ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 44, S-1 (2010), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2010/tables/S01Sep10.pdf, with 
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES: ANNUAL 
REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 38, S-1, (1997), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/ 
Statistics/JudicialBusiness/1997/tables/s01sep97.pdf.  
 142 Robel, supra note 5, at 47–48; CARRINGTON, MEADOR & ROSENBERG, supra note 1, at 
16–17 (noting that over the past few decades the duration of individual arguments has dropped 
from one hour to forty-five minutes, to thirty minutes, to twenty minutes, and in some cases 
less than fifteen minutes); POSNER, supra note 2, at 119 (in cases where oral argument is 
actually allowed, the average time allotted is less than twenty minutes).   
 143 Robel, supra note 5, at 47–48; CARRINGTON, MEADOR & ROSENBERG, supra note 1, at 
17 (citing Charles R. Haworth, Screening and Summary Procedures in the United States 
Courts of Appeals, 1973 WASH. U. L. Q. 257, 281 (1973) (noting that it is now quite common 
for cases to be heard without any opportunity for oral argument at all)). 
 144 Robel, supra note 5, at 48.  
 145 Id. (citing J. CECIL & DONNA. STIENSTRA, DECIDING CASES WITHOUT ARGUMENT:  AN 
EXAMINATION OF FOUR COURTS OF APPEALS 20 (Fed. Judicial Ctr. 1987)).  
 146 BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 4, at 112.  Paul D. Carrington and 
his co-authors argue that the reasons for curtailing oral argument do not justify a reduction in 
appellate values.  The reasons typically offered for reducing, or eliminating altogether, oral 
arguments is that the arguments waste both the judges’ and the attorneys’ time.  A judge’s 
efforts to avoid a backlog of cases “does not in any way compensate for the impairment in the 
quality of the process which is wrought by the loss of oral argument.”  CARRINGTON, MEADOR 
& ROSENBERG, supra note 1, at 20.  Furthermore, time spent by lawyers traveling to oral 
arguments is no longer a major concern due to modern technology—oral arguments may be 
conducted via closed-circuit television or by telephone conferences.  Id. at 19-21.   
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Oral argument is a valued tradition.  Its importance to the correctness of 
appellate outcomes may not be quantifiable, but argument has long been 
seen as a fundamental part of the appellate tradition.  Many judges value 
oral argument not only as a way to obtain information, but as a way "to 
demonstrate to the parties that the members of the panel have attended to 
the issues raised on appeal, to permit interaction with members of the bar, 
to provide a forum for the presentation of issues of public concern, to 
acknowledge the court's responsibility for resolving such disputes, and to 
provide an opportunity for the judges to confer and hear each other's 
views.”147 
The value of oral argument lies not only in the actual benefit derived from 
argument in a given case, but also from the perception that all cases are treated 
equally and all parties have an opportunity to be heard before a panel of three Article 
III judges.148  Additional concerns arise from the fact that denial of oral argument is 
done with minimal input by counsel and often by staff, further reinforcing litigants’ 
perceptions of lack of access and fairness.149  In addition, there are concerns that the 
gain achieved is relatively small.150  The total judicial time expended on a case 
involves hours of brief and record review, research, memoranda drafting, and 
conferences.  The addition of a brief oral argument is a relatively small portion of 
this.151  Moreover, there is the possibility that decision time is extended and decision 
quality diminished by the lack of opportunity to narrow issues, obtain concessions, 
and test the extent or strength of the parties’ theories at oral argument.152 
                                                           
 147 FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 67, at 44 (quoting in part JOE S. CECIL & DONNA 
STIENSTRA, DECIDING CASES WITHOUT ARGUMENT: AN EXAMINATION OF FOUR COURTS OF 
APPEALS 159–60 (Fed. Judicial Ctr. 1987)); see also Donald P. Lay, A Proposal for 
Discretionary Review in Federal Courts of Appeals, 34 SW. L.J. 1151, 1154 (1981). 
[I]f a case is worthy of appeal, it is worthy of oral argument.  First and foremost, oral 
argument simplifies cases for the judges.  Socratic confrontation between judge and 
counsel at oral argument often disposes of seemingly complex issues by practical 
resolution.  Oral argument often serves to correct false impressions gained from 
reading briefs.  Invariably, . . . an exchange between judge and counsel during oral 
argument alters a judge’s attitude or vote in conference.  This is true in even single 
issue cases.  Finally, I agree with the philosophical importance of oral argument:  
visibility of oral confrontation between counsel and judge lends virtue to the legal 
system.  
 Id.  
 148 CARRINGTON, MEADOR & ROSENBERG, supra note 1, at 17 (“Oral argument gives to 
litigants the assurance that the judges themselves are making the decisions.  And it also gives 
litigants the sense of participation which is an essential of the adversary tradition.”).  
 149 FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 67, at 44–45; Lay, supra note 147, at 1154.  “Once a 
litigant is denied his right to have counsel present oral argument in a case worthy of appeal, he 
has indeed lost his right to the full deliberative process of the court.”  Id.  
 150 BAKER , RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 4, at 112. 
 151 Id. 
 152 Id. 
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Others view such a reverence for oral argument to exalt form and show over 
substance.  In 1980, then-Chief Judge of the Eleventh Circuit, John Godbold, 
described oral argument in clear or insignificant cases to be “a waste of societal 
assets in a world where there are other priorities.”153  
The best balance of efficiency and appellate values likely lies somewhere 
between mandatory oral argument and the present anemic rate.  
5.  Use of Senior Circuit and District Judges to Fill Panels 
The court has managed to put more judges onto appellate panels than their 
allotted number of full-time appellate judges would suggest by increasing the use of 
senior and visiting judges.154  Adding and filling judgeships are acts involving the 
elected branches of government, but the judiciary has made an internal policy 
adjustment to make greater use of senior judges—those that elect “senior status” 
rather than outright retirement.155  A 1993 study by the Federal Judicial Center found 
that: 
Senior judges who continue to handle appeals in their own circuits have 
been particularly valuable in helping the courts of appeals cope with an 
increased caseload while maintaining a consistent circuit law.  Active 
district judges also help ease the caseload burden.156 
It also noted that in circuits with particularly high numbers of judicial vacancies, 
“panels often include only one active circuit judge; some include none.”157  Some 
have suggested that senior judges are vital to the operation of the court under its 
current caseload pressures:  
Their service ameliorates the problems of expanding caseloads and 
persistent judicial vacancies in the federal courts….Without senior judges, 
some appellate courts would face “a disastrous build-up of backlogs,” 
“severe[ ]” problems “administer[ing] justice in a timely fashion,” or even 
                                                           
 153 John C. Godbold, Improvements in Appellate Procedure: Better Use of Available 
Facilities, 66 A.B.A. J. 863, 865 (1980) (“Perhaps most important of all, the appellate court’s 
function and value are demeaned by requiring it to carry out acts merely ceremonial, while 
pretending the facade is real.”). 
 154 FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 67, at 38; POSNER, supra note 1, at 100–01.  Visiting 
judges sat on approximately 47.3 percent of all circuit panels between 1965 and 1969.  Id. at 
101 (citing Justin J. Green & Burton M. Atkins, Designated Judges: How Well do They 
Perform?, 61 JUDICATURE 358, 363 (1978)).   
 155 Wilfred Feinberg, Senior Judges: A National Resource, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 409, 412–14 
(1990); David R. Stras & Ryan W. Scott, Are Senior Judges Unconstitutional?, 92 CORNELL 
L. REV. 453, 460 (2007); 28 U.S.C. § 371 (2006). 
 156 FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 67 at 38. 
 157 Id. at 38.  In recent years, however, most panels consist of two active judges, and either 
a visiting or senior judge.  Jeffrey O. Cooper & Douglas A. Berman, Passive Virtues and 
Casual Vices in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 685, 696 (2000); see also 
Marin K. Levy, The Mechanics of Federal Appeals: Uniformity and Case Management in the 
Circuit Courts, 61 DUKE L.J. 315, 328-32 (2011) (listing the number of active and senior 
judges per circuit).   
2013] POST-CRISIS RECONSIDERATION 75 
 
a “total breakdown in the trial of civil cases.”  Senior judges are 
“indispensable,” “essential,” “inestimable,” “invaluable.”158 
Senior judges bring experience, perspective, and flexibility to the appellate 
courts, and their use is an excellent method of addressing volume pressures.159  The 
nature of “senior status” allows them to be freely assigned to panels throughout the 
federal system, including in other circuits and in district courts.160  The use of senior 
judges does help to obscure the judicial understaffing problem, however, and there 
seems to be concern about the proper role of a senior judge, particularly one seeking 
a purely bureaucratic or purely itinerant role.161 
Likewise, many federal appellate panels are filled, in part, by district court judges 
sitting by designation.162  The term “by designation” is drawn from the statute 
authorizing the use of district court judges on circuit court panels.163  The chief judge 
of a circuit has broad authority to place district court judges on appellate panels, and 
the practice may be used “whenever the business of that court so requires.”164  
Though it has always been a feature of the modern federal court system that district 
court judges could sit as visiting judges on circuit panels, that practice has fluctuated 
over time.165  For example, while nearly twenty percent of merits decisions by circuit 
court panels involved a district court judge sitting by designation in the period since 
1980, these levels were highest in the early 1980s (twenty-five percent), lower in the 
period of 1986-93 (seventeen percent), and lower still in the period between 1994 
and 2000 (fifteen percent).166  Whether these decreasing levels are the result of 
                                                           
 158 Stras & Scott, supra note 155, at 455 (copious internal citations omitted).  But see 
POSNER, supra note 1, at 101 (Even though the use of visiting judges is appropriate 
sometimes, the extent of the use of visiting judges is a matter of concern—“In a court with 
nine or more active members and heavy use of senior and visiting senior judges, almost every 
panel will be different, and the difficulty of maintaining some reasonable uniformity of law 
within the circuit correspondingly increase[s].”).   
 159 Stras & Scott, supra note 155, at 455–56.  
 160 Id. at 455. 
 161 Id. at 507–16. 
 162 Richard B. Saphire & Michael E. Somaline, Diluting Justice on Appeal?: An 
Examination of the Use of District Court Judges Sitting by Designation, 28 U. MICH. J. L. 
REFORM 351 (1995). 
 163 28 U.S.C. § 292(a) (2006). 
The chief judge of a circuit may designate and assign one or more district judges 
within the circuit to sit upon the court of appeals or a division thereof whenever the 
business of that court so requires.  Such designations or assignments shall be in 
conformity with the rules or orders of the court of appeals of the circuit. 
Id.  
 164 Id. 
 165 See 28 U.S.C. § 292 (1988) (Historical and Revision Notes) (noting that district judges 
sitting by designation at the appellate level was a feature of the original Evarts Act in 1891). 
 166 James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Designated Diffidence: District Court Judges on 
the Courts of Appeals, 35 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 565, 565, 572 (2001). 
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increased availability of appellate judges, which seems unlikely, or concerns 
regarding the use of district judges in an appellate capacity, district court judges 
remain involved in a significant percentage of federal appellate decisions.  
This significant use of district court judges in appellate decisionmaking provides 
many of the benefits of using senior circuit judges.  It extends the resources of the 
appeals courts, allowing them to hear more cases.167  However, as with the use of 
senior judges as active circuit judges, the use of district court judges does present 
some problems.  First, as with senior judges, using district court judges to fill panels 
obscures the need for more circuit judges and takes those judges away from the 
duties their normal place in the federal court system requires of them.  Second, in 
addition to those problems, the use of district court judges presents additional 
difficulties because a district court judge was appointed, confirmed, and accustomed 
to a different role in the judicial hierarchy, one which he or she must return to after 
his or her circuit service.  The presence of an “unequal” member on so small a 
decision-making body seems likely to result in some changes in the decision-making 
process.  An empirical study of such panels found that district court judges sitting by 
designation were less likely to author a majority opinion, less likely to dissent, and 
more likely to join a majority opinion that provokes a dissent.168  In addition, they 
“were significantly less likely than regular appellate judges to reflect their personal 
or professional backgrounds when voting.”169  That is, in yet another way, it appears 
that district court judges are more passive and conforming than their circuit court 
counterparts or even than themselves in their usual district court roles.170  Some 
previous studies suggest that panels including a district court judge may be more 
likely to have a decision they join reviewed en banc.171  
These internal reforms have dealt with increasing caseload volume sufficiently to 
keep the courts running.  Other, often external, reforms have been suggested over the 
last several decades but not attempted.  These reforms fall into four broad categories:  
(1) increasing judicial resources; (2) limiting access to the courts; (3) restructuring 
the system; and (4) internal or quasi-internal reforms. 
B.  More of the Same—Increased Judges and Circuits 
The most straightforward response to an increased volume of appeals is to 
increase the number of appellate judges, and, if need be, appellate circuits.172  This 
                                                           
 167 Id. at 573 (“[T]he primary reported rationale is efficiency: District judges are asked to 
serve when there are not enough appellate judges to fill all panels due to vacancies, 
emergencies, or the sheer volume of cases.”). 
 168 Id. at 581–84. 
 169 Id. at 601. 
 170 Id. at 601; see also C.K. ROWLAND & ROBERT A. CARP, POLITICS AND JUDGMENT IN 
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 136, 139, 153 (1996); ROBERT A. CARP & C.K. ROWLAND, 
POLICYMAKING AND POLITICS IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 8–9 (1983). 
 171 Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 166, at 574 n.14 (noting the imprecision of such studies 
for judging the work of district court judges because they fail to discriminate between district 
court judges and senior or visiting judges).  
 172 Lay, supra note 147, at 1152.  Lay notes, however, that an increase in the number of 
appellate judges is only a palliative response and that “[s]uch a move is unwieldy and 
controversial to say the least.  It defies the wisdom of every recent student of judicial 
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has traditionally been the external reform of choice over the last century, but the 
increase in judgeships has not kept up with the increase in appeals filed—not even 
close.173  In 1970, the Courts of Appeals disposed of 10,669 cases, while in 2005, the 
Courts disposed of 58,319 cases.174  During that same period the number of active 
circuit judges increased much more modestly, from 97 to 167.175   
The severity of the crisis of volume is often measured by examining the large 
increase of cases and the very small increase in federal judgeships.  The problem at 
its most basic level is that there are insufficient Article III judges to handle appeals 
in the traditional pre-boom manner.  Demand for judicial services grossly exceeds 
supply.176  Nevertheless, the addition of federal judges and circuits to match the 
demand has never gained much traction, not even among the overworked judges 
                                                           
administration.”  Id.; see also Stephen Reinhardt, Whose Federal Judiciary Is It Anyway?, 27 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1, 1 (1993) (Congress has traditionally dealt with the caseload problem at 
the federal appellate level by adding more judges.); Alvin B. Rubin, Bureaucratization of the 
Federal Courts: The Tension Between Justice and Efficiency, 55 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 648, 
656 (1980); Posner, supra note 4, at 761–62; Dragich, supra note 1, at 45–49; McCree, supra 
note 4, at 789.  
 173 Cleveland, supra note 1, at 68, 173; FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 14; 1990 REPORT 
supra note 3, at 110; Parker & Hagin, supra note 2, at 211 n.1 (1994); Arthur D. Hellman, The 
Crisis in the Circuits and the Innovations of the Browning Years, in RESTRUCTURING JUSTICE 5 
(Arthur D. Hellman ed., 1990). 
 174 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS WORKLOAD STATISTICS 
FOR THE DECADE OF THE 1970S tbl.B1, 2 (1980); ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, U.S. 
COURTS OF APPEALS JUDICIAL CASELOAD PROFILE FOR 2010 1 (2010).  
 175 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS JUDICIAL CASELOAD 
PROFILE FOR 2010 2 (2010). 
 176 POSNER, supra note 1, at 94–97 (comparing private market ideas and trends of supply 
and demand to the federal courts of appeal): 
In a private market, an unexpected rise in demand has two effects (provided the 
producers are operating at their full capacity). . . . In the short run, when (by 
definition) producers are unable to expand their productive capacity, price rises to 
ration demand to the existing fixed supply.  In the long run, when producers can 
expand their capacity, supply will increase to accommodate (in part anyway) the 
higher demand and price will fall, though not necessarily to its level before demand 
rose.  However, the federal court system’s response to the steep and unexpected rise in 
the demand for its services that began in about 1960 (a rise approximated by the 
increase in case filings) has not followed this conventional pattern. 
Id. at 94.  Judge Richard A. Posner discusses two reasons why the demand for federal judicial 
services has not been met by simply increasing the number of appellate judges.  First, “it is 
politically impossible to raise federal judges’ salaries to a level that would attract high-quality 
candidates, in the number required, in the relatively unattractive conditions of employment 
that would exist if there were as many federal judges as the caseload increases in recent years 
would justify.”  Id. at 99.  Second, it is difficult to expand the courts of appeals—“one cannot 
just add judges to each of these courts, because beyond a certain point there are too many 
judges to deliberate effectively.”  Id.  
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themselves.177  Instead, the intramural reforms noted in Part II.A. above have been 
pursued to do more with less, or as some would suggest, to just do less. 
Increasing the supply of judges to meet the demand of appeals seems like the 
most obvious reaction, but it is unpopular with both Congress and the courts.178  
Increasing the number of appellate judges presents a number of problems.  First, 
increasing federal judgeships would cost the federal government.179  These costs 
include both direct costs, like salary and benefits, as well as indirect costs, like office 
space, courtroom space, and staff.180  Because federal judgeships are lifetime 
appointments, these costs would be difficult, if not impossible, to reduce once 
appointments were made.181  Second, increasing the number of federal judges is 
viewed by many judges, including Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, as 
                                                           
 177 This proposed reform to the federal judiciary has not gained popularity because many 
believe that an increase in the number of federal appellate judges would do more harm to the 
federal appellate system than it would good: 
Jumbo courts encourage litigants to demand more of the court’s resources; litigants 
are more willing to bring (and defend) claims in the hope of exploiting the indistinct 
jurispruduence of the circuit or by drawing a sympathetic appellate panel.  We can 
expect a court of appeals’ filings-per-judge to increase as the number of judges on that 
court increases, further diminishing the benefits attributable to new judges.  
Parker & Hagin, supra note 2, at 220 (quoting Judge Gerald Bard Tjoflat, More Judges, Less 
Justice: The Case Against Expansion of the Federal Judiciary, 79 A.B.A. J. 70 (July 1993)); 
see also Dragich, supra note 1, at 46–47 (Some believe that adding judges will create a 
“judicial Tower of Babel,”—meaning that more judges will lead to an increase in 
disharmonious voices on the law.  Furthermore, adding judges exacerbates the current 
problem with intra-circuit conflicts.); Daniel J. Meador, Struggling Against the Tower of 
Babel, in RESTRUCTURING JUSTICE 195 (Arthur D. Hellman ed., 1990); LONG RANGE 
PLANNING, supra note 72, at 10; Wilkinson III, supra note 1, at 1163–64 (When more judges 
are added, Congress feels justified in further expanding federal jurisdiction, and increased 
jurisdiction leads to even more cases at the appellate level.).   
 178 See Dragich, supra note 1, at 46–47 (citing Ruth B. Ginsburg, Reflections on the 
Independence, Good Behavior, and Workload of Federal Judges, 55 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 11 
(1983)) (Although Congress has traditionally relied on this method in dealing with the 
caseload problem, it has come to realize that adding more judges leads to more conflicts of 
law and disharmonious voices at the federal level.). 
 179 COMM. ON LONG RANGE PLANNING, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., PROPOSED LONG 
RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 17 (1994) [hereinafter PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN] 
(an increase in judges is not practically or economically feasible); see also Wilkinson III, 
supra note 1, at 1161 (noting the budgetary constraints that come with the creation of new 
judgeships).  But see Dragich, supra note 1, at 46 (those in favor of expanding the size of the 
federal judiciary believe this remedy would represent a “‘comparatively small’ national 
investment that would ‘ensure fair hearings to all persons entitled to the federal forum . . . .’”) 
(citing FED. JUDICIAL CTR., IMPOSING A MORATORIUM ON THE NUMBER OF FEDERAL JUDGES: 
ANALYSIS OF ARGUMENTS AND IMPLICATIONS 25-26 (1993)).   
 180 PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 179, at 17. 
 181 Posner, supra note 4, at 788 (commenting on the tenure provisions for Article III judges 
and the appointment of Article I judges for long, fixed terms).   
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undermining the prestige and attractiveness of the position of federal judge.182  High 
quality candidates would be less interested in the position, and the quality and 
perception of the federal judges would be diminished.  Third, additional judges 
would lead to administrative problems.  Expanding the size of the circuits would 
lead to loss of collegiality, for example.183  Fourth, increased appellate judges—
expanding the size of the circuits—results in less stable law.184  Lastly, increasing the 
number of appellate judges would increase the number of decisions rendered, 
ultimately adding to the Supreme Court’s workload.185  Each of these concerns could 
apply also to increasing the number of circuits. 
Increasing the supply of judicial decision-making resources remains an option, 
and a continued increase seems likely, but not a rate that fully brings the case-per-
judge ratio back to previous levels.  Fortunately, while appellate judgeships seem to 
have reached a plateau in recent years, the number of cases filed seems to be on the 
downturn.186  Where adding judges seems straightforward, but unpopular, limiting 
                                                           
 182 See id. at 763 (noting that Circuit judges are concerned about the dilution of their 
prestige and power that will follow—in their minds—from increasing the number judges in 
order to deal with the caseload problem); McCree, supra note 1, at 783 (adding judges lowers 
the status of the position) (citing H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 22–
30 (1973); W. KITCHEN, FEDERAL DISTRICT JUDGES: AN ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL PERCEPTIONS 
(1978)).  
 183 Posner, supra note 4, at 762; McCree, supra note 1, at 784.   
 184 Parker & Hagin, supra note 2, at 217 (arguing that the number of appellate judges in 
each circuit should be limited to twelve). 
[T]he recommendation to limit the number of appellate judges on each circuit . . . 
follows from the systemic fundamental that each federal circuit must create and 
sustain a “coherent body of circuit law,” and that this predictability of law is “created 
and preserved by a body of judges [a circuit] small enough to function truly as a 
court.”  The risk associated with the unpredictability that has been characterized as the 
now-too-common “law of the panel” is greatly enhanced in a large court of appeals (a 
“mega-circuit”).  Intra-circuit conflicts are spawned and fostered in “mega-circuits.”  
And the “signal of unpredictability thereby sent is, of course, unsettling to those who 
are supposed to follow, and base their affairs on the decisions rendered by the circuit 
courts:  the public at large, the business community even more specifically, and the 
district courts.  This unpredictability of law generates still more litigation; such an 
unpredictable system of justice encourages parties to “roll the dice” to see what panel, 
or “lot,” they draw.   
Id. at 217–18; see also LONG RANGE PLANNING, supra note 72, at 9; Posner, supra note 4, at 
763; Dragich, supra note 1, at 46–47; McCree, supra note 1, at 784. 
 185 Posner, supra note 4, at 763 (An increase in the Supreme Court’s workload may 
necessitate the creation of an additional Supreme Court.).  If the Supreme Court’s caseload is 
increased as a result of expanding the circuits—which would lead to an increase in the number 
of decisions rendered at the appellate level—the Supreme Court may find itself face to face 
with a volume “crisis” just as the federal courts of appeals did during the twentieth century 
(and arguably still experiences today).   
 186 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS JUDICIAL CASELOAD 
PROFILE FOR 2010 (2010); ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 
JUDICIAL CASELOAD PROFILE FOR 2005 (2005); ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, U.S. 
COURTS OF APPEALS JUDICIAL CASELOAD PROFILE FOR 2001 (2001).  Federal appellate 
judgeships have held steady at 167 over the last ten years while federal appellate filings has 
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access to reduce demand seems radical, but it may provide at least partial relief to 
the volume problem. 
C.  Limiting Access to or Need for Appellate Review 
If judicial resources will not be increased to compensate for the increased 
caseload, an alternative solution is to reduce the volume of cases.  Obviously, such a 
reduction must be done in a principled manner.  Various proposals to reduce or 
redirect appeals as a method of coping with the increase in the federal appellate 
caseload have been proposed. 
1.  Limitation of Jurisdiction  
The most direct way to reduce the federal case load would be to limit the federal 
courts’ jurisdiction.  The federal judiciary has its jurisdiction determined by 
Congress under the United States Constitution, Article III, sections 1 and 2.187  This 
jurisdiction, except for that explicitly spelled out in the remainder of Article III, can 
be expanded or reduced by Congress, and it has been from time to time.  
One possible way to reduce the flow of cases into the federal system would be to 
reinstate the amount in controversy requirement for “federal question” cases.188  An 
amount in controversy requirement, even for federal question cases, existed prior to 
1976 when it was removed for cases against the United States, its officers, agents, or 
employees.189  The requirement was subsequently removed for all cases in 1980.190  
Reinstating a minimum amount in controversy for access to the federal courts would 
certainly limit the cases filed in federal courts, and theoretically, the amount could be 
fixed at a value specifically set to achieve whatever caseload reduction was sought.  
While technically possible, this reform seems unlikely.  It would merely divert those 
cases into the state courts and undo the gains sought to be gained by removing the 
limits in the first place—probably equal application of federal law.191  The ability to 
bring all federal law claims in federal court carries an intrinsic logic that weighs 
against reinstatement of a monetary threshold.  
                                                           
risen from 57,464 in 2001 to a peak of 68,473 in 2005 and declined to 55,847 in 2010.  
Perhaps this downturn in filings, if it continues, demonstrates that the federal courts’ internal 
reforms have managed the increase in volume obviating the need for further reform, especially 
radical reform.  It should be noted, however, that observers have been concerned not only with 
the efficient process of cases but also with a protection of fundamental values of appellate 
decision-making.  BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 5, at 21–26. 
 187 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1–2. 
 188 See LONG RANGE PLANNING, supra note 72, at 21 (referring to the relatively recent 
abolition of the requirement but not proposing its reinstatement). 
 189 See Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub L. No. 94-574, § 2, 90 Stat. 2721. 
 190 Federal Question Jurisdictional Amendment Acts of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-486, §2(a), 94 
Stat. 2369. 
 191 Nancy Levit, The Caseload Conundrum, Constitutional Restraint and the Manipulation 
of Jurisdiction, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 321, 322 (1989) (“The selective use of caseload as a 
justification for restricting Article III jurisdiction leads to a decrease in the uniformity and 
predictability of decisions, and it blurs the boundaries of already ill-defined theories of federal 
jurisdiction.”).  
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Federal diversity jurisdiction cases, on the other hand, seem ripe for diversion to 
state courts.192  Federal courts’ authority to hear cases between parties from different 
states is long-standing, dating back to the Judiciary Act of 1789.193  However, these 
cases make up a significant portion of the federal docket and could effectively be 
heard in state courts.  The Long Range Plan for the Federal Courts in 1995 found 
that diversity cases represented one in five federal civil cases in the federal district 
courts.  These diversity cases also represented about one in every two civil trials, 
about one in every ten civil appeals, and more than one in ten dollars in the federal 
judicial budget.194  This use of federal resources was a cause for concern for the 
Judicial Conference in 1995, and the study noted, “the federal courts’ diversity 
docket constitutes a massive diversion of federal judge power away from their 
principal function—adjudicating criminal cases and civil cases based on federal 
law.”195  Diversity cases now represent nearly double their 1995 share of federal civil 
case filings.196  Presumably, this greater share of filings has resulted in similar 
increases in trials, appeals, and expenditures.  Substantively, these types of cases 
could be more effectively dealt with by the state courts.  Again, the Long Range Plan 
succinctly explains:  “Perhaps no other major class of cases has a weaker claim on 
federal judicial resources.  Many believe the original justification for diversity 
                                                           
 192 See generally David Crump, The Case for Restricting Diversity Jurisdiction: The 
Undeveloped Arguments, From the Race to the Bottom to the Substitution Effect, 62 ME. L. 
REV. 1 (2010) (“Diversity jurisdiction is an idea whose time has come—and gone. In its 
present form, it serves its alleged purposes so inconsistently that its benefits are minimal, if 
they exist at all.”); Dolores K. Sloviter, A Federal Judge Views Diversity Jurisdiction Through 
the Lens of Federalism, 78 VA. L. REV. 1671 (1992); Howard C. Bratton, Diversity 
Jurisdiction—An Idea Whose Time Has Passed, 51 IND. L.J. 347 (1976); Robert K. 
Kastenmeier & Michael J. Remington, Court Reform and Access to Justice: A Legislative 
Perspective, 16 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 301 (1979) (listing the critics of diversity jurisdiction to 
include Roscoe Pound, Felix Frankfurter, and Robert H. Bork); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., 
Abolishing Diversity Jurisdiction: Positive Side Effects and Potential for Further Reforms, 92 
HARV. L. REV. 963, 969-84 (1979) (identifying benefits of abolishing diversity jurisdiction); 
Harry Phillips, The Expansion of Federal Jurisdiction and the Crisis in the Courts, 31 VAND. 
L. REV. 17 (1978); Elmo B. Hunter, Federal Diversity Jurisdiction: The Unnecessary 
Precaution, 46 UMKC L. REV. 347 (1977).  These sources routinely note that federal diversity 
jurisdiction has been controversial since the founding. 
 193 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006)); 
Carrington, supra note 3, at 412.  
The original Act created three levels of federal courts staffed by two ranks of judges.  
Each of the fifteen district courts were staffed by one district judge.  These courts 
exercised admiralty jurisdiction.  The same district judges and the Supreme Court 
Justices riding circuit, all serving part-time, staffed the three circuit courts.  These 
courts exercised original jurisdiction over diversity cases an appellate jurisdiction over 
smaller claims decided in the district courts.  
Id.  
 194 LONG RANGE PLANNING, supra note 72, at 30. 
 195 Id. 
 196 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS JUDICIAL CASELOAD 
PROFILE FOR 2010 tbl.C-2 (2010) (stating that 102,585 out of 282,307 civil cases filed were 
diversity of citizenship cases). 
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jurisdiction—to protect against local prejudice in state courts—longer exists, or that 
it exists in very few cases.”197  This expenditure of federal resources is heightened by 
the need for federal district judges to interpret and often predict substantive state law 
to reach a decision, a task that intrudes on state court lawmaking and draws the 
federal courts’ attention away from federal law issues.198  The federal Judicial 
Conference has endorsed eliminating diversity jurisdiction since 1977, and state 
court judges have expressed a willingness to help relieve the federal courts of their 
diversity caseload burden.199  The Long Range Plan made several proposals 
regarding eliminating or sharply curtailing federal diversity jurisdiction.200 This 
proposal is not entirely new and Congress has previously entertained the notion of 
abolishing diversity jurisdiction.201 Others, however, argue that diversity jurisdiction 
should be maintained, but with some modifications. 
In my view it would be a mistake to eliminate diversity jurisdiction.  
Diversity cases represent some of the most meaningful and challenging 
cases that make up the case load of the federal courts.  Certain recent 
disputes have demonstrated beyond question that the original reasons for 
giving federal courts diversity jurisdiction still exits. . . .  Even if our state 
judicial systems were de-politicized, diversity jurisdiction should still be 
retained by our federal courts at least with respect to certain cases.202  
In addition to fully diverting the flow of existing cases to state courts, proposals 
have been advanced to divert some existing cases through a winnowing 
administrative review or non-Article III court. 
2.  Use of Administrative Remedies and Article I Courts  
With increased federalization in the form of federal statutes that provide federal 
benefits or create federal regulations has come an increased federal judicial burden.  
For example, Social Security claims make up the single largest category of federal 
civil cases involving the United States as a party.203  At one-third of the U.S. party 
                                                           
 197 LONG RANGE PLANNING, supra note 72, at 30–31 (citing FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., 
WORKING PAPERS AND SUBCOMMITTEE REPORTS 426–35). 
 198 Id. at 31. 
 199 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 8–9 (Mar. 1977); CONFERENCE OF CHIEF JUSTICES, 
RESOLUTION I(5)(C) (1977); see also LONG RANGE PLANNING, supra note 72, at 31. 
 200 LONG RANGE PLANNING, supra note 72, at 29–30 (Recommendation 7). 
 201 See H.R. Res. 3689-3693, 98th Cong. (1979); H.R. Res. 2202, 96th Cong. (1979); H.R. 
Res. 130, 96th Cong. (1979). 
 202 Stanley Sporkin, Reforming the Federal Judiciary, 46 SMU L. REV. 751, 756–57 
(1993).  In particular, while the concern over state protectionism seems diminished, the 
politicized nature of state judicial processes remains.  In particular the election of state judges 
in increasingly partisan judicial elections, gives some pause about the abolition of diversity 
jurisdiction.  See Victor Flango, How Would the Abolition of Federal Diversity Jurisdiction 
Affect State Courts?, 74 JUDICATURE 35 (1990).  
 203 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS JUDICIAL CASELOAD 
PROFILE FOR 2010 tbl.C-3 (stating that 13,958 of 43,624 civil cases involving the United States 
were Social Security cases). 
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cases and nearly five percent of all cases filed in federal court, these claims make up 
a significant part of the federal judicial caseload.  Similar categories of cases include 
claims overseen by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which does 
only a cursory investigation before providing a “right-to-sue letter,” and perhaps 
civil rights claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.204  Any federal right or 
entitlement could provide, as a first level of review and response, an agency-based 
process that seeks to screen and resolve disputes.205  Moreover, any such claim that 
does not implicate the right to a trial by jury under the Seventh Amendment could 
also be heard by an administrative law judge or specially constructed Article I 
court.206  Even if such claims were ultimately filed in federal court, and it seems 
likely that at least some of them would not be, it would reduce the federal courts’ 
burden by having a more robust fact-finding and more formal legal determination.207  
While such processes would shift some burden from the federal courts to the 
administrative agencies, given equal financing, it is much easier to increase agency 
resources than to increase federal judgeships.  Agencies, Administrative Law Judges 
(ALJs), and Article I courts, properly formed and funded for the task, would be more 
flexible, more responsive, and more timely in regard to these claims within the 
agencies’ own bailiwick.208  
In addition to these structural changes to the paths for claimants under federal 
law, more substantive changes to federal law have been proposed. 
3.  Alteration of Substantive Law 
Another method of reducing the federal judiciary’s burden lies in purposeful 
alteration of existing law to simplify adjudication, divert cases to the state systems, 
or otherwise lessen the federal courts’ caseload.209  For example, the 1995 Long 
Range Plan for the Federal Courts identified the following as an overarching 
principle: 
Congress should be encouraged to conserve the federal courts as a 
distinctive federal forum of limited jurisdiction . . .  Civil and criminal 
jurisdiction should be assigned to the federal courts only to further clearly 
                                                           
 204 Id. 
 205 LONG RANGE PLANNING, supra note 72, at 33. 
 206 Id. at 34. 
 207 Id. at 33–34. 
 208 Id. 33–34. 
Indeed, all agencies with jurisdiction over various kinds of disputes should be 
empowered and required to conduct more thorough review and encouraged to resolve 
disputes before they may be brought to the federal courts. . . . 
 
Congress should be encouraged to empower agencies or Article I courts to adjudicate, 
in the first instance, those types of cases involving government benefits or regulation 
that routinely require substantial fact-finding. . . . 
Id.  
 209 Levit, supra note 191, at 344–53.   
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defined and justified national interests, leaving to the state courts the 
responsibility for adjudicating all other matters.210  
Toward that end, the Plan proposed a careful review of existing federal criminal 
law to eliminate provisions that do not serve a distinctly federal purpose.211  
Likewise, it proposed a careful limitation of future grants of federal criminal 
jurisdiction to cases where either federal government or national interests were 
clearly involved.212  Either some acts can be decriminalized on the federal level, 
returning their prosecution entirely to the states, or state courts can be granted 
concurrent jurisdiction over some federal crimes allowing states to share in the 
federal burden in exchange for continued federal assistance with matters not 
predominantly federal in character.213  Alternatively, some propose a broader repeal 
of federal criminal statutes, such as marijuana cases, which represent seven percent 
of federal criminal cases.214 
Similarly, federal law, or at least federal court jurisdiction, could be removed in 
matters that are fundamentally state law in nature and can be adequately adjudicated 
by the state courts.  For example, the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA) and 
the Jones Act provide a federal forum for worker injury cases in certain industries 
deemed national in nature (railway and maritime, respectively).215  While perhaps 
necessary at the time of their passage, significant state workers’ compensation 
systems have been enacted that make a separate federal remedy duplicative.216  
Likewise, while the railway and maritime industries are undoubtedly still important 
to the national interest, so too are a variety of other fields, such as air transportation, 
trucking, and civilian military defense and logistical support.  Similarly, the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) provides for concurrent 
state and federal jurisdiction over benefits recovery plans—claims that arise under 
state contract and trust law and which would be better adjudicated in state court.217  
However, the FELA and Jones Act cases make up less than one percent of all federal 
cases filed, and all ERISA cases, of which those mentioned are only a subset, make 
up only three percent of all federal cases filed.218  Still, the 1995 Long Range Plan 
advised that “notwithstanding that these cases are small in number, the jurisdiction 
                                                           
 210 LONG RANGE PLANNING, supra note 72, at 23. 
 211 Id. at 25. 
 212 Id. at 24–25. 
 213 Id. at 26–27 (noting that such burden sharing exists only one way given the increased 
federalization of crimes and the exclusivity of federal criminal jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C § 
3231). 
 214 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS JUDICIAL CASELOAD 
PROFILE FOR 2010 tbl.D-2 (2010). 
 215 Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 51-60 (West 2012); 15 U.S.C.A. § 
1014 (West 2012).  
 216 LONG RANGE PLANNING, supra note 72, at 36. 
 217 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1001–1461 (West 2012); see also LONG RANGE PLANNING, supra note 
72, at 36. 
 218 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS JUDICIAL CASELOAD 
PROFILE FOR 2010 tbls.C-2-C-3 (2010). 
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of the federal courts under these statutes should be eliminated.”219  As with the 
federal criminal law, a careful review of federal benefits statutes to evaluate the 
necessity of federal jurisdiction may review other areas ripe for reduction that is both 
jurisprudentially sound and a reduction of the federal court caseload.  Similarly, the 
Long Range Plan proposed careful consideration of future grants of federal 
jurisdiction, such as in any national health care or employee benefits plan.220 
Another change to substantive law that would reduce the federal judicial burden 
would be to streamline the existing law.  Judicial calls for more careful, precise, and 
purposeful statutory drafting are not uncommon.221  
4.  Discretionary Appeals/Alteration of Standards of Review 
The flow of cases into the federal appellate courts could also be limited by 
making appellate review discretionary in at least some cases or by adjusting the 
standard of review.222  Leave to appeal could be required in all cases, with differing 
standards for granting appeal, or merely in some class of cases where appeal is more 
often unwarranted.223  Each case would receive some level of review to determine 
                                                           
 219 LONG RANGE PLANNING, supra note 72, at 36. 
 220 Id. at 37. 
 221 BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 4, at 225–27; Harry T. Edwards, The 
Role of a Judge in Modern Society, 32 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 385, 424–25 (1983–1984); Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg & Peter W. Huber, The Intercircuit Committee, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1417 
(1984).  
 222 Lay, supra note 147, at 1155.  Lay sets forth the benefits of discretionary review. 
First, the judicial time needed to review petitions for discretionary appeal would be no 
greater than that which is now spent on screening cases for no argument.  Second, 
tremendous saving of judicial time and resources could be had by obviating the need 
for full review of lengthy briefs and records and the writing of formal opinions in 
hundreds of cases.  Third, such procedures would tend to place the indigent’s petition 
for review on the same evaluative basis as the appeal filed by the paid litigant.  Fourth, 
the long delay between filing notice of appeal and the appellate decision would be 
drastically curtailed for all cases.  Firth, and most importantly, all cases worthy of 
appeal would be afforded the full deliberative process, including the right to oral 
argument and written opinion.   
Id. at 1157; see also Parker & Hagin, supra note 2, at 235 (noting that discretionary review 
can help in restoring the important institutional balance between the appellate courts and the 
district courts); Dragich, supra note 1, at 52–54 (discussing the early proposals for 
discretionary review). Dragich states, 
Early proposals for discretionary review in the courts of appeals focused on specific 
types of cases, such as administrative proceedings, in which multiple appeals as of 
right are now provided.  The premise of such proposals is that one appeal as of right is 
sufficient to correct errors.  Subsequent proposals went further, suggesting that the 
courts of appeals be granted “discretionary leave to refuse to review, at least in civil 
cases, any appeal that on its face does not appear to be substantial or meritorious. 
Id. at 52 (quoting Lay, supra note 147, at 1151 (1981)).   
 223 1990 REPORT, supra note 2, at 117 (suggesting such a measure as a last resort).  
Abolishing appeals as of right would represent a “radical departure from one of the basic tenet 
of appellate justice.”  Dragich, supra note 1, at 53.  But see Lay, supra note 147, at 1155 
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whether any legitimate claim of error is presented, but not necessarily a full review 
with briefing, oral argument, and written opinion.  To some extent, this practice 
already exists in the form of screening and summary procedures, but it is 
disguised.224  This system of summary proceedings, diminished proceedings, and 
lack of written opinion already engenders concern and disapproval, so it is unlikely 
to be made more forthright and public.225  Such a system, while providing a 
substantial barrier to appellate review and lessening the overall court burden, does so 
“at a price to litigants in the quality of appellate justice which most Americans and 
their lawyers would or should be unwilling to bear.”226  
                                                           
(suggesting that the courts of appeals be allowed “discretionary leave to refuse to review, at 
least in civil cases, any appeal that on its face does not appear to be substantial or 
meritorious.”).  
 224 Charles R. Haworth, Screening and Summary Procedures in the United States Courts of 
Appeals, 1973 WASH. U. L. Q. 257, 275 (1973); Lay, supra note 147, at 1153. 
The concept of screening is a good one; courts of appeals should not require the 
calendaring of cases for oral arguments that are either frivolous or so simplistic on 
their face that the result is obvious to perceive.  The difficulty with screening is, 
however, that meritorious cases as well are being screened for no argument.  
Estimates in the Fifth Circuit are that 65% of the cases are screened for no argument.  
Many judges feel this procedure is necessary to save time and expense for the court, 
counsel, and the parties.  The truth is that in many appeals the denial of oral argument 
is simply short-sighted justice.   
Id. at 1153–54; see Dragich, supra note 1, at 53; Pether, supra note 28, at 34; see 
also CARRINGTON, MEADOR & ROSENBERG, supra note 1, at 133. 
 225 Cleveland, supra note 1, at 175; Pether, supra note 28, at 34 n.216. 
 226 CARRINGTON, MEADOR & ROSENBERG, supra note 1, at 133 (citing Graham C. Lilly & 
Antonin Scalia, Appellate Justice: A Crisis in Virginia?, 57 VA. L. REV. 3, 12–14 (1971)).  
Donald P. Lay suggests, however, that there are ways to avoid denying review to cases that 
are meritorious, thus eliminating—or at least lessening—the price to litigants. 
. . . certain controls should be legislatively established guiding the courts of appeals’ 
exercise of discretionary jurisdiction.  I would propose guidelines that allow a court of 
appeals to deny review of only those cases that are patently frivolous or those in 
which the district court opinion appears on its face to be correct as a matter of law or 
fact.  First, all defendants, whether appealing as indigents or not, would have a right of 
full review, including oral argument, in direct criminal appeals.  The denial of liberty 
and the stigma of conviction should require in every criminal appeal a full deliberative 
process.  Second, each litigant seeking an appeal in any civil proceeding would be 
req4uired to file a petition for discretionary review with the notice of appeal.  The 
petitions would be limited to ten pages and would set forth the reasons the appeal 
should be allowed. . . .  Third, a three-judge panel would then review this petition 
within ten days of its filing. . . .  Fourth, if the face of the petition presents any 
colorable issue of disputed law or presents a serious challenge to the sufficiency of the 
evidence, the appeal should be allowed.  Fifth, a district court could certify that an 
appeal presents a colorable issue for review; if such a certification is given, the partis 
could proceed without further permission from the court of appeals.  Sixth, if the 
petition for review is not deemed insubstantial by the panel, but nonetheless appears to 
raise a narrow or simple issue for review, the court may allow docketing of the appeal 
. . . . 
Lay, supra note 147, at 1155–56. 
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Alternatively, the tide of cases could be turned back in part by heightening the 
standard of review in some fashion.  Increasing deference to all or some trial court 
rulings would decrease the number of viable appeals.227  The modern trend is 
generally toward “a more penetrating appellate scrutiny of findings of fact.”228  This 
expansion of the scope of the appellate courts’ inquiry increases the courts’ 
workload, and a trend toward increased deference toward the lower courts’ rulings 
would reduce the courts’ workload.  Whether by rule of court or legislation, the 
standard by which the court judges appeals could be altered to make appellate review 
less searching and less likely to result in reversals.229  For example, the deference 
given to findings of fact could be extended to all lower court rulings, making 
reversal less likely but not impossible.230  Or, less drastically, the line between what 
constitutes a question of law as opposed to one of fact could be purposefully moved 
to expand the realm of questions of law.231  An extreme rule might entitle all lower 
court decisions to the type of deference given to jury verdicts, essentially closing the 
doors to appellate review to all but the most egregious of errors.232  These proposals, 
while direct and effective at limiting appeals, are problematic.  They artificially 
adjust a balance of power and responsibility between trial and appellate court that 
has evolved over decades of jurisprudence and, at the extremes, eliminates the 
important roles each body plays in the overall system.233  Moreover, they may be 
difficult to enforce given the current trend toward expanding even the existing 
standard to promote a more robust appellate review when such a review is desired by 
the particular appellate panel.234  
If effective, making appeals discretionary or subject to more deferential standards 
of review would reduce the incentives for litigants to appeal, but more direct 
imposition of disincentives has been proposed. 
5.  Disincentives to Bring Cases 
Though it cuts against the grain of the modern trend toward increasing access to 
justice and lowering the costs of seeking judicial remedies, the rate of appeals could 
be reduced through an increase in the costs of the appeal.235  Such costs to potential 
litigants could be economic or non-economic, and like many proposed reforms, 
could be enacted across all cases or in a limited class of cases.236  Examples of 
                                                           
 227 CARRINGTON, MEADOR & ROSENBERG, supra note 1, at 129–30. 
 228 Id. at 130–31. 
 229 Id. 
 230 Id. at 130. 
 231 Id. at 129–30. 
 232 Id. at 130. 
 233 Id.  
 234 Id. at 130–31 (noting that even the substitutions of specific standards such as “clearly 
erroneous” or “no substantial evidence” would be ineffective given the elasticity of these 
phrases in existing jurisprudence). 
 235 Id. at 133. 
 236 Id. 
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reforms to increase the costs of appeal include taxing costs and awarding fees for 
frivolous claims or dilatory conduct, minimizing stays pending appeal, and 
increasing the interest rate or accrual pending appeals to at least match the lending 
rate.237 
Another additional expense that could be added to the appeals process, though it 
would serve to reduce appeals in other ways, too, would be to add some alternative 
dispute resolution to the appellate process.238   
6.  Encourage Mediation of Appeals 
Cases might also be prevented from requiring appellate review through expanded 
use of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) in the trial and appellate courts.239  Cases 
diverted to ADR methods and resolved without requiring trial court adjudication 
each represent a case without the possibility of appeal.240  ADR encompasses a wide 
variety of conflict resolution methods including negotiation, mediation, arbitration, 
case evaluation, mini-trials, and conciliation, to name a few.241  Advantages of ADR 
include speed, privacy, finality, and reaching mutually beneficial or at least not 
purely distributive results.242  Congress has approved the use of ADR by federal 
agencies when appropriate.243 
Suggestions for reducing the flow of cases into the federal appellate system 
present incomplete, but possibly helpful, responses to the pressures of volume.  
Another approach would be to alter the federal appellate procedure to handle the 
existing appeals more efficiently. 
                                                           
 237 Id. at 134 (also proposing some reduction of the incentives for appellate counsel to 
bring excessive appeals, but noting the lack of any practical manner in which to do so for 
private, non-governmental counsel). 
 238 See generally Irving R. Kaufman, Reform for a System in Crisis: Alternative Dispute 
Resolution in the Federal Courts, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (1990); Albert W. Alschuler, 
Mediation with a Mugger: The Shortage of Adjudicative Services and the Need for a Two-Tier 
Trial System in Civil Cases, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1808 (1986); Philip J. Harter, Negotiating 
Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1 (1982); Maurice Rosenberg, Devising 
Procedures that are Civil to Promote Justice that is Civilized, 69 MICH. L. REV. 797 (1971).  
 239 BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 4, at 192; Robel, supra note 5, at 
23–27 (citing Paul Nejelski & Andrew S. Zeld, Court Annexed Arbitration in the Federal 
Courts: The Philadelphia Story, 42 MD. L. REV. 787, 787–800 (1983); Thomas D. Lambros, 
The Summary Jury Trial and Other Alternative Methods of Dispute Resolution, 103 F.R.D. 
461 (1984)).  
 240 BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 4, at 193.  
 241 Id.; Robel, supra note 5, at 24.  
 242 Some disagree, however, that mediation and other forms of alternative dispute 
resolution provide such advantages.  Lay, supra note 147, at 1153.  “[Mediation] is time 
consuming, and it is not the most convenient tool for circuits that have broad geographic areas 
such as the Eighth and Ninth Circuits.”  Id.; see also Robel, supra note 5, at 29–30 
(questioning whether ADR methods really are helpful in saving the courts’ time, litigants’ 
money, and decongesting court dockets).   
 243 Administrative Dispute Resolution Act, 5 U.S.C. § 571 (2006). 
2013] POST-CRISIS RECONSIDERATION 89 
 
D.  Altering the Appellate Procedure 
Some proposals have sought to alter the appellate procedure, not for the purpose 
of diverting appeals, but to more efficiently process the existing appeals.  These 
reforms fall between the kind of significant alteration of access or alteration of 
structure often proposed.  Each of these reforms attempts to conserve or stretch 
existing judicial resources.  First, the circuits could make use of appellate 
magistrates to help facilitate cases.  Second, the court could adopt two-judge panels 
to hear more cases with the present judicial resources.  Third, in an effort to conserve 
judicial time as well as court resources required to process appeals, the court could 
adopt a practice of greater orality. 
1.  Appellate Magistrates  
Judicial resources can be used more efficiently if some judicial tasks can be 
undertaken by non-judges working under the close supervision of judges.244  This 
model has been used very effectively in the use of magistrates in the district 
courts.245  At the appellate level, many judicial tasks are handled by the central court 
staff.246  However, the critical difference is that “a central staff is distinguished from 
a corps of magistrates by the staff’s lack of formal status, its anonymity, the lack of 
visibility of its work product, and the lack of any interaction with the interested 
parties and their advocates.”247  A magistrate would be able to perform tasks 
presently performed by both central staff and circuit judges, if properly subjected to 
circuit review when necessary.248  Those tasks performed by the circuit judges 
themselves that could be handled by magistrates represent a direction savings of 
judicial energy.249  Moreover, if even some of the more judicial tasks handled by 
central staff can be shifted to formal judicial officers whose decisions are made 
publicly, with the aid of parties’ counsel, and subject to appeal, a significant 
improvement to appellate justice will accrue.  The use of federal appellate 
magistrates would increase visibility, accountability, credibility, and efficiency of 
the appellate process.250 
                                                           
 244 BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 4, at 139–147.   
 245 John B. Oakley & Robert S. Thompson, Screening and Delegation, in RESTRUCTURING 
JUSTICE 135–36 (Hellman ed.,1990); Robel, supra note 5, at 34–36.   
 246 Id. at 136.  BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 4, at 139.   
 247 Oakley & Thompson, supra note 245 at 136. 
 248 Id. 
 249 Parker & Hagin, supra note 2, at 221 (noting that an increase in the number of 
magistrate judges may be essential to ensure efficiency when it comes to case management).  
“The theory behind the creation of the magistrates’ position was not to have them decide cases 
but to free judges from some of the pretrial tasks that interfered with deciding cases and 
writing opinions.” Robel, supra note 5, at 35 (citing Linda Silberman, Masters and 
Magistrates Part II:  The American Analogue, 50 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1297, 1321 (1975)).  
 250 Oakley & Thompson, supra note 245 at 136; Thomas E. Baker, Proposed Intramural 
Reforms: What the U.S. Courts of Appeals Might do to Help Themselves, 25 ST. MARY'S L.J. 
1321, 1349-51 (1994);  Frank A. Kaufman, James E. Noland & Mary M. Schroeder, Am. Bar 
Ass’n, The United States Courts of Appeals: Reexamining Structure and Process After a 
Century of Growth, 125 F.R.D. 523, 548 (1989) (Report of the American Bar Association 
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2.  Two-Judge Panels 
It has been proposed on occasion to alter the default panel size from three judges 
to two.251  At least facially, a switch to two-judge panels would immediately increase 
appellate efficiency by almost a third.  It would seem that such a simple change with 
such a substantial benefit would be easily agreed upon and enacted.  However, three-
judge panels are not only traditional but also mandated by statute.252  That said, two-
judge panels are not without precedent, being allowed by statute when an assigned 
judge cannot see an appeal through to decision.253  The presumption could be 
reversed with minimal procedural change, making two-judge panels the default, and 
bringing in a third judge where there is disagreement.254  Such a practice raises 
concerns about diminishing the quality of decision making through the loss of a third 
perspective and through inherent coercion to agree so as not to require the greater 
procedure.255  In addition, there is certain mysticism to the judicial triad, leading to 
concerns that “[t]he entire decision making process would be changed, perhaps in 
unknown ways, by moving from a trial to a dyad.”256  Nevertheless, the Federal 
                                                           
Standing Committee on Federal Judicial Improvements) (“By analogy to the role now 
assigned to magistrates in the district courts, central staff attorneys might function as appellate 
magistrates whose recommendations and opinions were provided to the parties and were 
subject to objections.”).  Contra Richard S. Arnold, The Future of the Federal Courts, 60 MO. 
L. REV. 533, 542 (1995). 
There's even something in the Ninth Circuit called an appellate magistrate. 
Incidentally, that phrase makes my blood run cold.  If I've got an appeal, I want a 
judge to decide it.  I don't know about appellate magistrates.  This is not a term that is 
in any statute.  It's something the Ninth Circuit invented, and they are getting away 
with it so far.  Let me tell you, though, in fairness to them, that the only thing their 
appellate magistrate does is to evaluate fee applications.  I have reservations about 
more decisions being made by non-judicial personnel. 
Id.; Stephan Reinhardt, Surveys without Solutions:  Another Study of the Courts of Appeals, 73 
TEX. L. REV. 1505, 1512 (1995) (“Undoubtedly, calls for appellate magistrates and then 
appellate magistrate-judges will soon follow.  If we continue to increase our reliance upon 
others in order to deal with our unmanageable dockets, we run the risk that Article III judges 
will lose control of Article III decisionmaking [sic] and that we will surrender far too much of 
our discretion to those who have not been nominated by the President and confirmed by the 
Senate.”). 
 251 FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 62–64, app.C(2), 96–98; BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON 
APPEAL, supra note 4, at 172–73. 
 252 28 U.S.C. § 46(b)-(c) (2006).  
 253 28 U.S.C. §46(d) (2006) (“A majority of the number of judges authorized to constitute a 
court or panel thereof . . . shall constitute a quorum.”); BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL, 
supra note 4, at 172.  
 254 BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 4, at 172–73 (citing Daniel J. 
Meador, Appellate Case Management and Decisional Processes, 61 VA. L. REV. 255, 281–82 
(1975) and CARRINGTON, AM. BAR FOUND., supra note 15. 
 255 BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 4, at 173. 
 256 Id.  
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Courts Study Commission recommended the use of two-judge panels, at least on a 
trial basis.257  
3.  Oral Argument Only/Greater Orality 
An increase in oral argument, not just as a supplement to extensive written 
briefing but in place of it, may yield greater efficiency.  It is undeniable that federal 
circuits have significantly reduced the use of oral argument.258  More significantly, 
the grant of oral argument has drastically diminished; the rate of oral argument has 
dropped to nearly a quarter of all appeals, down from forty percent in 1997.259  The 
length of oral argument, when granted, is often as little as fifteen minutes per side.260  
However, oral argument remains a fundamentally important part of the appellate 
process, and the opportunity for public hearing before the court alone militates in 
favor of greater oral argument.261  One federal court reform expert, Daniel J. Meador, 
has proposed not just restoring oral argument, but reversing the priorities entirely 
and offering oral argument without time limit and only minimal written 
submissions.262  The practice of preparation, processing, and consideration of lengthy 
briefs represents an extensive expenditure of time and effort in the appellate 
process.263  Proponents of greater orality believe that the quality of appellate justice 
can be maintained or even improved by focusing on the oral argument stage, which 
can occur more quickly and efficiently.264  It does, however, seem less useful the 
more complex the case, though in the modern era of case tracking, it seems practical 
that many cases could be heard in this fashion.265 
E.  Significant Structural Changes 
A broad examination of possible reforms to address caseload volume and 
preserve the inherent values appellate justice must include the numerous structural 
                                                           
 257 FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 116; BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 
4, at 173.  
 258 BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 4, at 109; Donald P. Lay, 
Reconciling Tradition with Reality: The Expedited Appeal, 23 UCLA L. REV. 419, 420 (1975–
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318–43 (1972). 
 259 Compare ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED 
STATES: ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 44, tbl.S-1 (2010), available at 
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pdf, with ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES: 
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 260 BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 4, at 110. 
 261 Id. at 111–12, 114. 
 262 Daniel J. Meador, Toward Orality and Visibility in the Appellate Process, 42 MD. L. 
REV. 732, 749 (1983); BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 4, at 165. 
 263 BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 4, at 166 n.56. 
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changes to the federal judicial system that have been proposed over the last forty 
years.266  These alternative structures vary from the general to the specific, and many 
of them are exceedingly complex.267  In addition, many are merely variations on a 
theme, as proposals were revised and re-envisioned throughout prior court 
reforms.268  The proposed structural reforms seem, generally, to involve one or more 
of the following six structural changes, which are not necessarily mutually exclusive.  
1.  Pre-Court of Appeals Court 
One structural change that would grant immediate caseload relief would be the 
formation of an appellate tier above the existing districts and below the existing 
circuits.269  Such a court could rule on cases that are numerous, but often 
unsuccessful, as well as those alleging factual error or abuse of judicial discretion, 
which are subject to a very demanding standard of review.270  Cases presenting a 
genuine matter of legal ambiguity could be passed on or appealed to the circuit 
courts, often as a discretionary appeal.271  Such a structure could be created as a 
wholly new body, though most proposals suggest it as a bifurcation of the existing 
circuits or the creation of an appellate division or en banc panel of the district 
court.272  In a sense, this system would do openly, and with the use of Article III 
judges, what the current circuit courts do via staff and clerk-driven case management 
and unpublished opinion.  This division of labor presents benefits such as efficiency, 
transparency, and judicial determination of all matters.273  However, it would expand 
the number of federal judges, with all the costs and perceived costs that would entail, 
                                                           
 266 LONG RANGE PLANNING, supra note 72; BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra 
note 4.  Many other sources that propose or discuss proposals for structural change to the 
federal judicial system. 
 267 For example, Professor Daniel J. Meador proposed an “elaborate plan” involving 
replacing the existing circuits with twenty numbered divisions, five lettered divisions above 
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ON APPEAL, supra note 4, at 266–67; Meador, supra note 262, n.102.  
 268 BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 4, at 268 (comparing the Meador 
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note 2, at 120–21. 
 269 Carrington, supra note 3, at 433. 
 270 BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 4, at 256-57; Carrington, supra note 
3, at 434.  For a similar proposal at the state level, see Shirley M. Hufstedler & Seth M. 
Hufstedler, Improving the California Appellate Pyramid, 46 L.A. BAR BULL. 275 (1971).   
 271 BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 4, at 265–61. 
 272 Id. at 265–71. 
 273 Once the courts of appeals have been divested of their error-correcting function, they 
will have more time to adequately perform other tasks and functions.  Carrington, supra note 
3, at 434.  Carrington notes, however, that to some observes, it becomes less clear whether the 
courts of appeals will be left with an important function to perform once they have been 
divested of their error-correcting function.  Id.  
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as well as potentially causing status issues between judges ostensibly in the same 
position who are elevated or relegated to superior or subordinate positions.274  
2.  Post-Court of Appeals Court 
More commonly proposed is the imposition of an additional appellate tier above 
the existing circuits.275  Such a tier may include a small number of regional courts or 
a single national upper-tier appeals court.276  The basis for appeals to this court varies 
between proposals from discretionary to by designation of the United States 
Supreme Court.277  Such a system would have a less direct impact on the number of 
cases in the appellate system, but would improve appellate justice by decreasing 
circuit splits, reducing the use of the very cumbersome circuit en banc process, and 
reducing the effect of United States Supreme Court’s reduced docket in the face of 
increased appeals.  It would also have the effect of allowing a body of Article III 
judges to screen and highlight cases ripe for Supreme Court review—a task presently 
influenced, in large part, by recent law school graduates clerking with the Court.278 
This proposal gained considerable support in the mid-1970s, and was proposed 
by several court reform studies.  By 1983, a test model called the Intra-Circuit Panel 
(ICP) gained the support of five Supreme Court justices and judicial subcommittees 
in both houses of Congress.279  This panel would consist of one judge, serving part-
time for a brief term.280  Despite being desirable to a majority of Supreme Court 
Justices and favorably reported to full committees in both houses, the legislation 
stalled and has not been revived.281 
3.  Use of Specialized Subject Matter Circuits or Panels 
Another proposed structural reform aimed at improving the quality of appellate 
justice and increasing efficient handling of cases is the use of specialized subject 
matter courts.282  Such courts would be constructed with specific and exclusive 
jurisdiction to handle cases within a well-defined subject area such as tax, admiralty, 
criminal law, civil rights, labor relations, government benefits, bankruptcy, and 
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 275 BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 4, at 232; FINAL REPORT, supra note 
2, 119–20. 
 276 BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 4, at 232, 248–49. 
 277 Id. at 232, 248-49. 
 278 See generally ARTEMUS WARD & DAVID L. WEIDEN, SORCERERS’ APPRENTICES (2006) 
(discussing the history of the role of law clerks at the Supreme Court). 
 279 BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 4, at 244; see also Arthur D. 
Hellman, The Proposed Intracircuit Tribunal, 11 HAST. CONST. L.Q. 375, 377–78 (1984). 
 280 BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 4, at 243–44. 
 281 Id. at 244. 
 282 Posner, supra note 4, at 777–89 (discussing the pros and cons of creating more 
specialized courts); see also David P. Currie & Frank I. Goodman, Judicial Review of Federal 
Administrative Action: Quest for the Optimum Forum, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 68–74 (1975); 
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specific federal administrative agency appeals.283  These courts would operate 
alongside the existing circuits as co-equal bodies sharing the appellate caseload 
burden in a rational manner.284  Alternatively, divisions could be made within the 
existing circuit courts based on subject matter either through formal divisions or 
panel assignments.285  Some circuits have already begun to assign cases to panels 
based on judicial experience.286 
Obviously, these specialized courts provide panels with greater expertise than is 
possible from a panel of generalist judges with a portfolio of every increasing federal 
statute to deal with.287  Subject matter specific courts provide an alternate Article III 
forum for federal disputes where expert judges can provide more consistent, stable, 
and efficient justice.288  The idea is not new, and its expansion has been strongly 
advocated.289  The U.S. Court of Military Appeals, Temporary Emergency Court of 
Appeals, and Federal Circuit were established to hear subject matter specific 
dockets.290  However, specialized courts have traditionally been disfavored.291  The 
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primary concern seems to be of the possibility of capture of the court by special 
interests, repeat litigants, and even the bench and bar of the specialized court itself.292  
Another concern is the lack of percolation and varied opinions in the development of 
the law in areas governed by a single specialized court whose first interpretation of 
the law in that field would be definitive in nearly every case.293  Despite these 
concerns, the Federal Courts Study Report in 1990 did propose a national tax court 
of appeals, though it declined to recommend the creation of a similar administrative 
law court.294  Further expansion into specialized courts has not been forthcoming.                                                        
4.  Consolidation of Circuits into Jumbo Circuits 
Another structural reform that has been proposed is the consolidation of the 
existing circuits into smaller number, perhaps four or five, “jumbo” circuits.295  Such 
a reform takes to heart Congress’s refusal to divide the Ninth Circuit and the Ninth 
Circuit’s continued growth and adjustment to make a large circuit function.296  
Proponents of this alternative look at the Ninth Circuit not as an oversized behemoth 
but as a model for large circuits that, while imperfect, have been enacting reforms to 
use reorganization, case management, and technology to make for a functioning 
                                                           
specialization. Posner, supra note 4, at 779–86; Martha J. Dragich also provides insight into 
the benefits and harms of creating additional specialized subject matter courts:   
Specialty courts would offer a better opportunity for persons well versed in the subject 
matter to maintain a coherent body of law, and one that would apply nationwide.  
Specialty courts, however, run afoul of the apparently strong preference in this 
country for generalist courts.  Some suggest that specialty courts are likely to become 
the captives of one side or the other in disputes that regularly come before them, and 
that they are likely to lose perspective about the relationship of the special subject 
matter to the overall body of federal law.  They also might present problems for 
litigants in trying to decide where to take an appeal since many cases involve both 
“special” and “general” issues of law.  
Dragich, supra note 1, at n.258.    
 292 BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 4, at 222. 
 293 Id. at 262.  
 294 Id.; 1990 REPORT, supra note 2, at 71–73. 
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or a Molehill?, 71 CAL. L. REV. 913, 940–41 (1983).  The number of judges within these 
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inadequacy, and case overload, in the federal courts.”  Parker & Hagin, supra note 2, at 222.  
 296 BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 4, at 276–77. 
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large circuit.297  By reducing the number of circuits, this alternative reduces the 
number of inter-circuit conflicts and makes a supposedly uniform federal law more 
uniform and less regional.298  It also anticipates the necessary future growth of the 
federal judiciary and creates a structure better able to absorb those additional 
judgeships.299  Rather than waiting for growth to occur and attempting to force 
judges into circuits of traditionally accepted size or trying to split the circuits to 
create additional circuits of traditionally accepted size, this proposal looks to create a 
model that accepts and plans for increased case volume and increased judges.300  
This model promises increased administrative efficiency, the opportunity to 
reconstruct circuit boundaries and internal structures with modern sensibilities, and 
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remains relatively consistent with the present two-tiered appellate review format.301  
The drawbacks to such a restructuring mirror those leveled against the undivided 
Ninth Circuit; namely, its size makes it unwieldy, limiting the coherence and 
consistency of its jurisprudence.302  These concerns have driven much of the modern 
reform—or lack reform—such as splitting the Fifth Circuit and holding the line 
against the addition of judgeships.303 
5.  Redrawing of Circuits into Many Small Circuits 
A proposal opposite that of the call for jumbo circuits is the suggestion that the 
existing circuits be dissolved and redrawn as small circuits—typically nine-judge 
circuits that still hear cases in three-judge panels.304  This model shares with the 
proposal for jumbo circuits the lessening of regional differences in circuits but takes 
that concept even further.  These mini-circuits need not be constructed based on 
geographic boundaries, which has the effect of further divorcing them from regional 
or state affiliations.305  These myriad circuits would, of course, increase the incidence 
of circuits split;306 to avoid this, a “law of the circuits” would bind panels to the first 
determination of a matter in any circuit court of appeals.307  Panels in each circuit 
would be bound by all precedents from all courts of appeals.308  This model 
essentially creates a single federal national court of appeals, creating and deciding 
cases according to a unified appellate law, with the circuit courts acting as 
organizational tools rather than arbiters of regional interpretation.309  Like the jumbo 
circuit proposal, this model also anticipates the addition of judges to the system and 
allows for them by planned reorganization of circuits—a task of minimal disruption 
given the circuits’ new status as small administrative rather than large substantive 
divisions with the intermediate appellate tier.310  Perhaps more than any other 
proposed structural reform, this model offers a way to turn back the clock to a truly 
small, collegial, nine judge appellate court.311  However, this model is fraught with 
                                                           
 301 Id. at 78. 
 302 Id. at 279, 86–95;  Hellman, supra note 298, at 56–57.  (“Intracircuit conflicts have 
become a ‘pernicious’ problem in that they provide insufficient guidance to district judges and 
make it difficult for lawyers to advise their clients.”); Dragich, supra note 4, at 33.      
 303 BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 4, at 65-67, 202–03. 
 304 Id. at 239; Parker & Hagin, supra note 2, at 219; Dragich, supra note 1, at n.257, 56.   
 305 BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 4, at 239.   
 306 Dragich, supra note 1, at 56 (“[I]ncreasing the number of courts or divisions guarantees 
additional conflicts, and hence, exacerbates incoherence and the possibility of injustice to 
litigants.”); POSNER, supra note 1, at 100 (increasing the number of circuits would increase the 
number of conflicts between the circuits, which in turn would increase the workload of the 
Supreme Court).   
 307 BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 4, at 239. 
 308 Id. 
 309 Id. at 240. 
 310 Id.  
 311 Id.  
98 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:47 
 
problems inherent in its practical execution.  For example, the numerosity of circuits 
makes inter-circuit conflicts inevitable, and the subtle distinction between 
distinguishing and overruling a sister circuit makes simple adherence to the national 
precedent exceedingly difficult.312  Some manner of en banc procedures would be 
required, and as litigants perceived their cases as wrongly decided, those procedures 
would increase in use, perhaps to the extent of making that en banc body become the 
actual national court of appeals.313  In addition, this model’s elimination of 
geographic circuit boundaries represents a total departure from the historical model 
and political realities related to federal circuits.314  Such a model is interesting 
theoretically and offers an innovative restructuring, but it is hampered by practical 
and political problems that make it unlikely to be adopted. 
6.  A True National Court of Appeals 
The goal of a single national court of appeals could also be achieved by 
consolidation of all existing circuits into a single body.  As federal court reform 
expert Thomas E. Baker explained, “[t]he idea of a single, unified national court of 
appeals has an alluring simplicity: eliminate altogether the geographical boundaries 
between the Court of Appeals and consolidate them into one unified administrative 
and jurisdictional tier of an intermediate court.”315  Such a court would create a more 
uniform federal law, minimize conflicts, and create efficiencies in administration.316  
This structural reform, arguing that freeing the appellate courts from a focus on the 
“law of the circuit,” would have a beneficial effect on the federal law, and judicial 
personnel could be more efficiently employed under a single unified court.317  It also 
allows for the easy addition of “an indeterminate number of judges arranged in 
greater numbers of general and special divisions,” thus allowing easy expansion to 
meet the increase in caseload.318  Such a proposal, for all its intuitive appeal, does 
have some problems.  First, the unification of the entire middle tier of the federal 
judiciary would create a massive, complex, and powerful entity, and the exact nature 
is difficult to envision.  Some, like proponent and court reform expert Paul D. 
Carrington, envision a complex internal structure that divides the courts work into 
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General and Special Divisions, with the Special Divisions being constructed to hear 
cases regarding a single subject matter of national importance or volume of 
litigation.319  This structure arguably balkanizes the federal jurisprudence, federal 
procedure, and the federal judiciary in a different, but perhaps more significant, way 
than the existing circuits.320  It also potentially stifles procedural and administrative 
innovation presently undertaken by the individual circuits by creating a single 
system nationwide.321  Perhaps the greatest concern regarding such a plan is that 
instead of a single, unified, efficient national appellate court, what will be created is 
a single, stagnant, massive bureaucracy.  
Structural reforms offer the opportunity to address the problem of caseload 
volume in a broad, sweeping manner that focuses on both dealing with volume and 
maintaining the values of appellate justice.  However, such reforms, in part because 
of their large-scale nature and in part because they must go through the political 
branches, are difficult to fully assess and more difficult to enact.  As we come upon a 
half-century of discussions about increasing caseloads and concerns about the nature 
of appellate justice, perhaps it is time for another round of federal court reform study 
or perhaps even some significant structural reform. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
Our past is strewn with detailed studies of the federal judiciary and proposals for 
its reform to meet the increasing caseloads and maintain high standards of appellate 
justice.  The federal courts must be commended for having managed the “crisis of 
volume” through internal reforms, but those reforms have altered the nature of 
appellate justice.  High case volumes are here to stay, and as Congress continues to 
expand federal law and regulation, caseloads can be expected to continue to rise.  
Some reaction seems desirable.  Perhaps some of the reform proposals previously 
proposed are less radical or more applicable than they were when first raised or last 
studied, or perhaps we need additional study to develop new proposals for the new 
millennium.  
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